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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
MDA-UAW Local 571
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #U-0001-84
MDA-1-84

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The issue is the Union's grievance dated September 25, 1984
which reads in pertinent part:
The MDA grieves the Company for its failure
to implement super seniority by work category during the current recall to work from
strike.
A hearing was held in New London, Connecticut on February
8, 1985 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A stenographic record was

taken and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The issue involves the super-seniority
councillors, and is narrow.

status of Union

It is not whether the councillors

should have been recalled from the strike based on super-seniority
Their general super-seniority status for that purpose is acknowledged by the Company.

Rather, the question is whether their

super-seniority upon recall should have been with seniority groups
or within work categories.
The Strike Settlement Agreement does not deal specifically
with the question.

It does provide for the recall of the Union's

six principal officers within two weeks.

It also provides for

the general recall of "striking employees" by seniority within
seniority groups.

But, with the undisputed and acknowledged

fact

that the councillors were entitled to some form of super-seniority
and because councillors (or stewards) are traditionally viewed
differently from ordinary employees, I am not prepared to conclude

that the reference to "striking employees" in the Settlement
Agreement was intended to cover the Union councillors.

Put

another way, with the specific reference to the Union's six
principal officers, and the different reference to "striking
employees," I am persuaded that a reference to and coverage of
the councillors was omitted.
Indeed, based on the entire record, I conclude that there
was no meeting of the minds of the parties on the groups or
categories to which the councillors' super-seniority would apply
in the recall.

I believe that in good faith the Company thought

that it applied to seniority groups because the Settlement Agreement referred to seniority groups in the recall of regular employees.

On the other hand I believe that because the councillors

had a status different from both rank and file employees and the
Union's principal officers, the Union in good faith believed that
their recall, based on super-seniority would obtain to work
categories.

Their believe in this regard is rooted in language

found in the collective bargaining agreement which accords
councillors super-seniority in work categories in case of layoffs.
The disagreement is compounded by the provision of the
Strike Settlement Agreement that:
"All strike employees will be placed on layoff
status as of the effective date of the agreement for purposes of receipt of unemployment
compensation."
It is just as reasonable for the Union to have believed that all
employees, councillors as well as rank and file, were placed on
layoff status "for lack of work" within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement, as it is reasonable, as the Company
asserts, that the layoff status was for the single and limited
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purpose of receiving unemployment insurance.

After all, a lay-

off within the meaning of the contract also carries with it the
entitlement to unemployment insurance, so that the distinction
argued by the Company in this case is not a conclusive difference.
In my judgment, the disagreement must be resolved by the
general applicability of the collective bargaining agreement, as
incorporated by reference in the Strike Settlement Agreement.
The second introductory paragraph of the Strike Settlement Agreement provides:
"The parties agree that the strike between the
parties which commenced on June 9, 1983, is
ended and settled upon the following terms and
conditions contingent upon ratification of the
terms of the proposed collective bargaining agreement . (emphasis added)
The reference to "upon ratification" in Section 6A of the Strike
Settlement Agreement apparently applies to both the Settlement
Agreement and the collective bargaining agreement.
I find therefore that the contract and the Strike Settlement
Agreement are both applicable, and where, as here, the Strike
Settlement Agreement is unclear or inconclusive regarding the
issue at hand, the contract should be looked to for clarification
and determinativeness.
Section 16 of the collective bargaining agreement provides
in pertinent part:
"...councillors ... shall be the last employees
in their work category to be laid off ... for
lack of worK."
I accept the Union's assertion that recalls follow the layoff procedure, inversely.
says so.

Indeed, Section 14 of the contract

It reads:
"Laid-off employees shall be recalled to their

-4functional category, work category and
seniority group in the reverse order of
their layoff."
I am persuaded that that procedure, supported by evidence
of past practice, applies to the councillors and means that
councillors, accorded super-seniority in work categories for
layoff purposes, are to be recalled from lay off based on their
super-seniority

in their work categories.

I find that that is what should have taken place here.

A

different arrangement regarding councillors should have been set
forth specifically in the Strike Settlement Agreement, as was the
case for the six principal Union officers.

That that was not

done, and with the overall application of the contract as
incorporated into the Strike Settlement Agreement, the explicit
contract language is preeminent.
Moreover, the relation of councillors to work categories
is a matter of institutional Union representation in the work
place.

It represents the negotiated agreement of the parties

on the number of councillors and the scope of their representational capacity.

To change their presence among the work force

(in layoffs or recalls) from work categories to seniority groups,
is to unilaterally

change their representational scope. Any such

change should be clearly and explicitly agreed to by mutual
understandings.

I do not find any such explicit or jointly

agreed to change here.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance of September 25, 1984
is granted. The Company violated the contract by failing to recall the councillors
based on their super-seniority in work categories .

-5The Company shall make the appropriate administrative adjustments, including appropriate
adjustments in pay for the councillors adversely affected.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 10, 1985
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) °' '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OCAW

LOCAL 8-397
OPINION

AND

AWARD

and
GATX Terminals Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company violate the collective
bargaining agreement by reducing the
ship's crew manpower requirements on or
about July 24, 1984? If so, what should
the remedy be?
A hearing was held at the Company's offices on March 21,
1985 at which time representatives of the above named Union and
Company appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
A stenographic record was taken; the Arbitrator's Oath was waived;
and both sides filed post-hearing briefs.
On April 25, 1985, in accordance with arrangements made at
the hearing and accompanied by representatives of the parties,
the Arbitrator made a visitation to the Company's docking
.
facilities and observed the docking of a ship and its cargo removal by the reduced crew complement that is the subject of this
case.
Prior to July, 1984,

the number of employees generally

assigned by the Company to ship's crew handling ships and large
barges was seven.

In April and May of 1977, the Union filed

grievances challenging the assignment of less than seven employees
to a ship's crew.

The Company denied the grievances on the basis

it was management's right to determine "safe and efficient" crew
levels.
On July 24, 1984, the Company issued a memorandum

announc-

ing changes in the then current ship's crew manning levels.

-2-

Among other changes, the new policy stated that henceforth five,
rather than seven employees would be assigned to the tie-up of
all gasoline-carrying vessels which used rope, rather than cable
for securing the vessel to the facility's dock.

The same re-

duction was instituted for chemical-carrying ships with seven
or less hose connections.
assigned to disconnecting

For both classes of vessels the crew
the ships was reduced to four.

Chemical

carrying ships with multi-hose connections (i.e. at least eight
hoses) were to continue to be tied-up by seven-member crews.

How-

ever these vessels would be disconnected and released by five,
rather than seven employees.

Special provision was made for two

specific ships (Alaskan and Pioneer) because of their multiplehose connections.

Additionally, the number of employees assigned

to barges using GATX hose was set at four.

An employee was also

assigned to barges using their own hoses, although no employee
had previously been so assigned.

Finally, the July, 1984 memo-

randum directed that vessel crewmembers were not to drop breast
and spring lines off their ships.

Instead, those lines were to

be handed directly to ship's crew members, who would then secure
them to the dockside bollards.
On August 9 and 10, 1984, the Union grieved the Company's
action, claiming that the reduced crew sizes "constitute a grave
safety and health hazard to our membership."
The dispute is a narrow one.
The Union does not dispute the Company's managerial right
to determine manning levels.

Rather, its complaint is that these

particular reduced manning levels create a safety hazard for the
employees and constitute an unsafe condition of employment
violative of the contract.

So the issue is one of "safety," not

a general challenge to a mangerial prerogative to fix crew size.
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It is also undisputed that the issue involves ships as
enumerated above using rope for tie-ups and release and not
those using cable.

As to the latter, there is no present change

and hence no dispute, over the crew complement.
The contract does not specifically deal with the safety
aspects of crew, size for tie-up,release and cargo handling.

It

is immaterial whether the contract references to Safety and
Health in Article 21 deal with the safety claims involved in this
case.

I am satisfied that if not express, there is a general

implied condition of any collective agreement that work practices
will be undertaken in as safe a manner as possible, and work
assignments

that are not normally or inherently unsafe or

dangerous shall not be made unsafe by precarious precedures or
inadequate manning.

So, the Union's grievance in this case is

arbitrable, either under the language and spirit of Article 21
or under the aforesaid implied condition.
However, the Union bears the burden of proving the unsafe
conditions especially in view of the undisputed right of management to unilaterally determine manning levels.

I am not persuaded

that the Union has met the burden in this case.
There is insufficient probative evidence presented by the
Union of specific dangerous or unsafe conditions.

Examples of

accidents, near accidents, new and hazardous work duties, new and
dangerous work procedures, or even testimony on a dangerous or
unsafe increase in physical strain or new or increased exposure
to bodily harm, have not been shown by the standards of proof
required to meet the burden.
The Union's case, albeit sincere and concerned, is largely
speculative on the critical issue.

At most the Union has shown

that the members of the reduced size crews may have to x^ork harder
or with increased activity; that their physical duties and physica
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demand may have been enlarged, especially (as I observed during
my visitation) in the loading and unloading of cargo using the
many and various sized hoses involved; that they are required to
be familiar with and use new or different equipment, like the
pelican hook, but the proofs of these circumstances fall short
of evidentiary proof of dangerous or unsafe conditions.

In short,

there may be an impact on the employees that warrant attention
in collective bargaining, but the impact has not been shown to
be unsafe, hazardous or dangerous, within the meaning of the
express or implied obligations of safety of the contract.

A

possible hazard, such as sparks from equipment dragged on the
steel dock, has been dealt with by the Company, and if not
eliminated, reduced below the point of realistic danger.

More-

over, it was not clearly shown that that condition, even if still
present can be significantly changed by an enlarged crew.
Frankly, the foregoing is based not only on my assessment
of the record of the hearing, but also, importantly, on my
observations of the docking of the ship and its cargo removal on
April 25.

Though the Union representatives felt that the activities

that day were not representative of a typical situation, I cannot
conclude that they were not, or that a different or more typical
docking, release and cargo handling are or would be so different
and so much more precarious with a reduced crew as to cause me to
ignore what I saw.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company did not violate the collective
bargaining agreement by reducing the ship's

— S—

crew manpower requirements on or about
July 24, 1984.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: June 25, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss -:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

s
\l

Mediation & Conciliation Service, Administrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 1164

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. 82-30
Case #83K/29637

and
General Cable Corporation
(Alphaduct)

In accordance with the arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement between the above named Union and Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide a dispute involving the grievance of George Christian.
A hearing was held at the Company plant on April 19, 1985
at which time Mr. Christian, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

At the conclusion of the hearing,

the Union presented an oral summation.

Subsequently, the Company

filed a post-hearing brief.
The Union makes three claims. It asserts that the Company
violated Article XIV of the contract dated 1974-1977 when it
terminated the grievant on May 8, 1979.

As to this claim the

Union seeks the reinstatement and retention of the grievant's
seniority, retroactive to the date of his employment.
Second, the Union claims that the Company violated Article
XXI of the 1974-1977 contract when it discontinued the grievant's
insurance benefits on September 30, 1977.

It seeks restoration

and retention of those benefits retroactive to September 30, 1977.
Third, the Union contends that the Company violated Article
IV Section 2 of the 1974 Master Pension Plan when it denied the
grievant a disability retirement pension.
that pension to the grievant.

It seeks an award of

-2The following facts were stipulated by the parties:
1.

The grievant last actively worked on
May 8, 1975.

2.

The grievant filed a Workers Compensation claim on February 21, 1978;
the Company received notice of that
claim on May 16, 1978; and the grievant
was awarded disability benefits by the
New Jersey Workers Compensation Board
on February 17, 1981, retroactive to
May 8, 1975.

3.

The Company had terminated the grievant ' s seniority on May 8, 1979.

4.

The grievant is and continues to be
totally disabled from work at the
Company.

5.

The grievant was covered by the Company for Blue Cross and Equitable benefits until September 30, 1977.

The Union's third claim on behalf of the grievant, for a
disability retirement pension under the Master Pension Plan for
Hourly Rated Employees, is denied.

The clear language of the plan

makes the grievant ineligible despite his stipulated disability.
Article IV Section 2 of the Plan provides in pertinent part:
"An employee...shall be deemed to be totally
and permanently disabled if he has qualified
for and is awarded a "Disability Insurance
Benefit" under the Federal Social Security
Act..."
It was conceded in this proceeding that the grievant was
denied a "Disability Insurance Benefit" under the Federal Social
Security Administration.

Hence he does not meet the threshold

contractual requirement as negotiated by the parties in their
collective bargaining relationship.

Under that circumstance, the

Arbitrator lacks the authority to go behind the ruling of the
Social Security Administration.

The grievant's ineligibility for

a disability retirement pension under the Pension Plan is therefore incontestable in this proceeding.
As the grievant was terminated on May 8, 1979, the controllin
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collective bargaining agreement, in effect at that time, is the
agreement dated September 1, 1977 to August 31, 1980.
Article XVI (Leaves of Absences) Section 1, accords employees sick and Workmen's Compensation leaves of absences "for a
period not to exceed three months."
Clearly that provision must be read in conjunction with
Article XIV when an employee who is on a sick leave of absence
reaches the point of loss of his seniority.
Article XIV Sections l(d) and (f) are applicable to the facts
in this case.

In sum they provide that after twelve months on

sick leave (excluding work(ers) compensation) an employee with ten
years or more seniority and who has not returned to work, shall be
placed on layoff status, and shall retain his seniority while on
layoff for thirty-six months.
At the end of that latter period of layoff, the employee
loses seniority and may be terminated.
At the time the Company terminated the grievant in 1979,

• .
it complied with the foregoing contract provisions.

The griev-

ant ' s workers compensation claim had not been decided so his
status was first on sick leave and thereafter on layoff, either
officially or constructively.

From the date he last worked, May

8, 1975 to the date of his termination or loss of seniority on
May' 8, 1979 the requisite contractual forty-eight months had
elapsed.

Inasmuch as the grievant received all the contract

benefits due him on sick leave and/or on layoff during that period,
I find no reason not to conclude that the first twelve months of
that period was a period of sick leave under Section l(d) and the
remaining thirty-six months the period of layoff prescribed by
Section 1(f).
Hence, under these facts, the Company's action on May 8,
1979 was consistent with the contract.
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What remains unanswered

is the question of whether this

action is to be re-opened, re-assessed and possibly changed by
the later fact of a worker's compensation award to the grievant
in 1981, which was made retroactive to May 8, 1975. If the workers' compensation decision, with its retroactive effect to the
year 1975 is to be contractually factored into the analysis it
must be assumed, only as a matter of law (because of course, the
Company could not know of the decision at the time) that the
workers' compensation ruling was applicable when the grievant
was terminated on May 8, 1979.

Under that circumstance, the

collective bargaining agreement of 1977-1980 is still controlling
because the termination action took place during its term, but
Section l(d) of Article XIV would not apply because, by its express terms, work(er) compensation leaves are excluded.

With

Section l(d) inapplicable, Section l(f) is inapplicable as well
because it is not triggered or activated by the procedures of
Section l(d).
There is no other provision

of Article XIV expressly deal-

ing with or referring to employees unable to work and on sick or
disability leaves of absence due to a worker's compensation injury
Indeed, the exclusion of worker's compensation from Sec tion l(d)
makes clear that the word "injury" in Section l(c) refers to noncompensable or non-work related injuries.
The foregoing leaves the grievant's situation covered by
Article XVI Leaves of Absence.

I do not find that the contract

provisions thereunder give the grievant any greater benefits than
what the Company accorded him and I am unable to conclude that
the grievant's termination was violative of the letter or intent
of the applicable contract clauses.
As previously noted, Article XVI provides for a worker's
compensation leave of not more than three months.

The grievant's
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"leave," whether for sickness, disability or constructively for
worker's compensation, certainly exceeded that period.

Even if

the Company by its actions extended the grievant's leave, that
extension is contractually limited to one year, under Section 7.
The grievant's status, whether on leave or layoff, exceeded the
additional year.
Beyond that point, in my judgment, a rule of reason must
apply to this case.

It is well settled that an employer may

terminate an employee who is chronically ill or disabled with
no realistic prospect of returning to work, even if the employee's
illness or disability is beyond his fault or control.

After a

reasonable time, when the chronic condition and inability to return to work are established, the termination is proper.

In

addition to the contract provision, I conclude that that is what
is relevant to this case.

The contract does not perpetuate in-

definitely an employee's seniority while he is on worker's compensation leave.

Therefore a point comes when the Company's right

to terminate may be exercised.

I conclude that a four year period

from 1975 to 1979 is certainly sufficient for the grievant to have
been carried as an employee on leave and/or on layoff.

And that

with the undisputed fact that as of May 8, 1979 he was (and still
is) totally disabled, the Company was justified in terminating
his seniority and his employment rights.
The grievant's insurance benefits were terminated on
September 30, 1977.

Under either of the aforesaid contract

theories, the Company acted properly.

Article XXIII, Insurance

Benefits, provides for coverage in the case of occupational or
non-occupational sick leave of absence "for the duration of the
sick leave of absence up to a maximum of one year from the date
such leave commences."

The grievant's leave began on May 8, 1975.
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Whether it expired one year later under the leave of absence provisions of the contract (if a worker's compensation leave) or a
year after it began under the Loss of Seniority provision of the
contract (if it was a sick leave), the Company continued the
grievant's insurance beyond one year, in either or each instance
It covered his insurance benefits until September 30, 1977 or in
other words for two years and four months after the beginning of
either type of leave of absence.
So, the Company's action ending the grievant's insurance
benefits (Blue Cross and Equitable) was not in violation of the
contract.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following

AWARD:

The grievance of George Christian is denied.
The Company did not violate the contract
when it terminated him on May 8, 1979. It
did not violate the contract when it discontinued his insurance benefits on September
30, 1977 and did not violate the contract
by denying him a disability retirement pension
under the Master Pension Plan.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: Jline 25, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.
"

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 5, IUMSWA

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. 1-0120-83-10

and
General Dynamics Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Was the 30 day suspension of Neal White for
just cause? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on October 26, 1984 at which time Mr.
White, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken;
and the parties filed post-hearing briefs0
The basic charges against the grievant have been proved
to my satisfaction.

I am persuaded that in his zeal to show

the OSHA inspectors what he thought were unsafe equipment and
conditions, the grievant committed acts of misconduct warranting
discipline.

He left his work place without permission, attempted

to join the inspection party though denied persmission to do so
by management, refused to return to his work location when instructed by supervision to do so, used profance, insulting and
threatening language and acted in a way that was physically
threatening to a supervisor, and from anger and frustration
cracked his fist into a metal panel and then wrongfully reported
how the injury occurred when treated for it.

-2-

The only possible mitigation lies in the grievant's apparently
sincere and understandable concern for what, he believed, to be
a safety hazard and his intent to assure that the OSHA inspectors
saw the basis of his OSHA complaint.
However, those circumstances explain his actions, but do
not excuse them.

The grievant was not invited to be part of

the inspection team by the Company, the Union, or the OSHA representatives. There is no evidence that the inspection was or would
have been compromised or inadequate without his presence.

Neithe:

the contract nor the safety rules, nor any other regulation in
the record call for the presence of the complainant at an OSHA
inspection.
In any event, as is well settled, he should have complied
with the directions of supervision, and grieved if he thought he
was being dealt with wrongfully.

He had no right to try to take

matters into his own hands no matter how important or compelling
he though his presence at the inspection to be.
I am not prepared to hold that a penalty of less than a
thirty day suspension would not have been enough.

But it is not

for the arbitrator to reduce the penalty unless the original
suspension is excessive or unreasonable0

I accept the Company's

testimony that it considered the grievant's angry and uncontrolle
emotional state in deciding on a suspension rather than the penalty of discharge for the grievant's insubordination.

I cannot

find that explanation to be arbitrary or unrelated to the facts
involved.

Hence, I do not find the thirty day suspension, though

-3severe, to be excessive or otherwise improper under the circumstances.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The thirty day suspension of Neal White was
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 11, 1985
STATE OF New York )_
0 .
o o ••
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

7
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
IAM Local 1871

OPINION AND AWARD
Gr. M-242-84

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was the discipline of John Silva for just
cause? If not what shall be the remedy?
The grievant's five-day disciplinary suspension is
sustained on the grounds of "contributory

negligence."

I find that he operated the locomotive crane in an
unsafe manner, causing the crane to topple over.
not use "wedges" as he should have„

He did

He lifted too heavy a

weight and knew either that he was doing so or was dangerously approaching an excessive load, because he used a carpenter to stand by and signal him if the crane's wheels lifted
off the railroad track0

To anticipate that manifestly unsafe

consequence (i.e. the crane's wheels lifting off the rails)
was to tempt danger and to operate the equipment in a grossly
precarious manner.
The Union argues that to tip over a crane is so serious and dangerous that it is a dischargeable offense; and
that the grievant's suspension of only five days is an admission by the Company that he did nothing wrong, but that
some minimal penalty should be imposed "for the record."
The Company concedes that it did not think it could
sustain a discharge "because it was the first offense by an
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employee of fifteen years."
I think differently than either the Union or the Company.

I believe, based on the grievant's testimony and the

absence of refutation testimony by the Company, that the
grievant operated the crane as he normally did, albeit dangerously; that supervision knew of this manner of operation and
did not take steps to stop it.

In short, I conclude that the

grievant's errors were tolerated by local supervision, and
the accident resulted from this joint negligence.
I have no jurisdiction over supervision, but I find
that under the circumstances, where the grievant and supervision must both bear blame, a five-day suspension imposed
on the grievant was proper as a reasonable response to the
grievant's part of the dual responsibility.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above
named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discipline of John Silva was for just
cause.

DATED: February 14, 1985
STATE OF New York )
CQ .
. oo • .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD0

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council
New London County, AFL-CIO

AWARD
Grievance No. C-14-82

and
General Dynamics Corporation,
Electric Boat Division

The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator in the
above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
Grievance No. C-14-82 is granted. The
parties are directed to negotiate the
matter of damages and/or remedy. If
they fail to agree within 60 days from
the date of this Award, the matter shall
be referred back to the Undersigned for
arbitral determinations of damages and/
or remedy. For the latter purpose the
Undersigned retains jurisdiction.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 30, 1985
STATE OF New York ) ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Metal Trades Council
New London County, AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievance No. C-14-82

General Dynamics Corporation,
Electric Boat Division
In accordance with Article VI of the collective bargaining
agreement effective June 30, 1972 to June 30, 1975 between the
above-named parties and pursuant to the Memorandum of Decision
issued by United States District Judge Robert C. Zampano in Civil
Action No. N-74-62, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
What shall be the disposition of
Grievance C-14-82 dated May 6,
1982?
Hearings were held in Groton, Connecticut on March 16,
May 21, May 23, October 9, October 22, and November 7, 1984, at
which times representatives of the Metal Trades Council and
General Dynamics Corporation, Electric Boat Division, (hereinafter also referred to as the Union and the Company, respectively)
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
trator's Oath was waived.

The Arbi-

A stenographic record was taken.

The

parties filed post-hearing briefs, the Union filed a reply brief,
and the Company filed a reply memorandum.

Representatives of the

parties accompanied the Arbitrator to the Green House, Rad-Con
Training Facility on October 9, 1984 to observe the various types
and uses of Con-Con bags.
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The Union filed the following grievance dated May 6, 1982:
The United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners of America, Local No. 1302,
contends that Electric Boat Division of
General Dynamics violated the 1972/1975
agreement by assigning Electric Boat employees that were not members of Carpenters Local No. 1302 to perform work normally performed by Dept. 252 Carpenters
(installation of Con-Con bags on submarines
from 1972 through the present).
It must be noted that this grievance is
consistent with understandings reached by
the parties involved by judgment and at
hearings before the United States District
Court, Civil No. N-74-62.
Therefore, we request that the installation of all Con-Con bags be returned to
the jurisdiction of Carpenters Local #1302.
Furthermore, we request that Carpenters
Local #1302 be remunerated for all hours
worked by Electric Boat employees who were
directed to install Con-COn bags that were
not members of Carpenters Local #1302 from
1972 through the current agreement.
The Company responded to the grievance as follows:
The grievance is arbitrable, by virtue
of a representation made before Judge Zampano,
only to the extent that it charges the Company
with a violation of Article V respecting the
assignment of "con-con" bag work under the
1972-1975 Agreement. The grievance is outside
the boundaries of the Company's representation
made to Judge Zampano, and therefore inarbitrable, insofar as it alleges a violation of any
provision of the 1972-1975 Agreement other than
Article V. In accordance with the Company's
representation made to Judge Zampano, the grievance is arbitrable only before an arbitrator
mutually selected by the Company and the Metal
Trades Council.
The references to the decision of United States District
Judge Robert C. Zampano concern Civi 1 Action No. N-74-62 which
preceded the instant arbitration.

The issue presented to Judge

Zampano involved, "whether there was a breach of the collective
bargaining agreement between the parties when the defendant
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'contamination-container' bags to Local 1302's members."
1.

Id. at

The Memorandum of Decision indicated "that in 1972 the Com-

pany had instructed employees of the STO Department (pipe-fitters
electricians, and machinists' union) to perform work on the socalled 'con-con' bags." Id. After the Carpenters Union had assert
eda:claim to the work, the MTC considered the dispute, notified
the Company that a jurisdictional dispute existed, and informed
the Company that the MTC had awarded the assignment to the
Carpenters Union.

The Company did not comply with the MTC dec-

ision so the MTC commenced an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut.

The parties

litigated the meaning of Article V and whether the contractual
grievance procedure had been exhausted.

The court found that

the exclusionary language of Section 9, Article VI, which precludes arbitration of jurisdictional disputes that are covered
by Article V, "is not sufficiently clear and unambiguous to permit the dispute between the parties concerning Article V to
escape arbitration." Id. at 6.

The court explained the ambiguity

as follows:
While it is true that the MTC has authority
to resolve all jurisdictional disputes, the
term 'jurisdictional disputes' is susceptible
to different interpretations. At least two
reasonable possibilities exist. In the context of this case, it may include, as the
plaintiffs claim, a dispute involving worker
placement, or, as the defendant argues, simply
refer to the designation of the proper affiliated union.
Id.

at 6-7.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the action, with-

out prejudice, until the parties had exhausted their contractual
remedies.
PERTINENT CONTRACT PROVISIONS
The following provisions of the 1972-1975 collective
bargaining agreement between the parties are relevant:
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ARTICLE V
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
The Employer and the Metal Trades Council, together with
all the affiliated Local Unions of the Council, agree that in
the event any jurisdictional disputes arise with respect to the
jurisdiction of occupational titles as listed in Appendix A or
any occupational titles added thereto by the Employer such dispute shall be referred to the Metal Trades Council of New London
County for settlement in the following manner:
Upon notice by either the Employer or an affiliated Local
Union involved in a jurisdicitional dispute, the Metal Trades
Council will appoint a committee whose responsibility will be
to render an interim decision within seven (7) calendar days of
receipt of said notice. Such decision shall remain in full force
and effect until such time as amended or ratified by the International Union Presidents whose Local Unions are involved in such
dispute.
It is further agreed that pending the adjustment of jurisdictional disputes there shall be no stoppage of work and the
work in dispute shall continue to be performed as assigned by
the Employer. The provisions of this Article shall be absolutely
and equally binding upon the Employer, the Metal Trades Council,
its affiliated Local Unions, and all employes in the bargaining
unit.
ARTICLE VI
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Section 1.
A. Should differences arise between the Employer and any
of its employes or the Union with respect to the effect, interpretation, application or alleged violation of any of the provisions of this agreement, there shall be no suspension of work
but an earnest effort shall be made to settle differences promptly in the manner hereinafter outlined.
Section 2. It is agreed that all grievances shall be dealt with
as provided for in this Article:
D. Step 4. The arbitrator shall be without power to
change, alter or amend the language of this Agreement. The fees
and expenses of the arbitrator shall be shared equally by the
parties and the decision of the arbitrator shall be final and
binding on the parties.
E. It is agreed that no Local Union grievance shall be
referred to arbitration without the approval of the Metal Trades
Council in writing.
F. Should the Metal Trades Council give written permission
to arbitrate a dispute to one Local of the Union, the Metal
Trades Council will also be bound by the decision of the
arbitrator.
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Section 9. It is further agreed that jurisdictional disputes
are not a subject for the grievance or arbitration procedure as
defined in this Article but will be settled in accordance with
the procedures as set forth in Article V Jurisdictional Disputes.
ARTICLE XL
UNION-EMPLOYER COOPERATION IN CRAFT
JURISDICTION AND WORK PRACTICES
Current practices in regard to work assignments and operations that have been in effect under the 1968-1972 Agreement shal
remain in effect. It is the intention of the parties to work
cooperatively toward the mutually beneficial objective of enabling the Electric Boat Division to compete successfully in the
technologically advancing shipbuilding industry. The parties
agree to discuss changes in current practices which may be proposed by either party and which are reasonably designed to improve productivity without infringing on fundamental craft union
principles.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 11
It is mutually understood and agreed upon that as new
employees are hired for the Shipyard Test Organization they
will be granted representation within the Machinist Local 1871
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
and Local 620, United Association of Journeyment and Apprentices
of the Plumbing and Pupefitting Industry of the United States
and Canada on an equal basis (1 for 1).
This Agreement applies to all new employees hired for the
Shipyard Test Organization exclusive of those to be represented
by the IBEW in accordance with the agreement in effect between
the parties.
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 37
CON CON BAGS
1. The Employer agrees to pay an additional seventeen
cents (17C) per hour to employes while engaged in the erection,
testing, repair and removal of Con Con bags (Contamination
Containment bags).
2. Erection, testing, repair and removal of Con Con bags
shall be performed only by employes who have been qualified for
such work in the manner described below and whose qualification
is currently in effect.
3. In order to be initially qualified, an employe must
successfully complete a training course consisting of radiological control fundamentals and the contamination containment
work package fundamentals. An employe must also be requalified
in both sections of the above-mentioned training course on a
periodic basis (presently, every two years).
4. An employe's qualification to perform erection, testing, repair and removal of Con Con bags shall automatically
terminate if he has not performed such work at any time during
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any continuous period of six months.
5. An employe's qualification may be terminated if his
installation performance technique results in excessive rework.
6. Employes selected for the above-mentioned training
course must meet the following basic requirements.
(a) First class rating with previously
outstanding performance.
(b)

demonstrated

Safety consciousness.

(c) Ability to appropriately respond to direction from
other trade employes.
(d)

Ability to correctly ascertain the nature of a pro-

blem.
In their briefs the parties have reflected in detail and
well, their respective cases as found in the record.

In setting

forth the contentions of the parties, I have chosen to repeat
sections from the briefs as written.

Therefore the structure,

organization and even redundancies or repetitions of said briefs
will be found in the following contentions.
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union set forth the following arguments in support
of its position:
1.

Union Structure

The Union emphasizes that the Metal Trades Council (MTC)
of the Metal Trades Department, AFL-CIO, is the collective bargaining agent at the Company and consists of ten autonomous
local unions. Included among these local unions are the Carpenters, Machinists, Pipefitters, and Electricians according
to the Union.

The Union cites specific requirements for union

membership,benefits that accrue to members of particular unions,
and the effect of and limitations on transfers between locals.
The Union recognizes that the Company's determination of a new
employee's initial assignment results in that employee's assignment to a particular union.

Thereafter, a loan of an employee
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from one department to another department is permitted according
to the Union.

The Union points to a special hiring arrangement

that exists for the STO Department because of the inclusion of
Electricians, Pipefitters, and Machinists in the department.

The

Union asserts that no mechanism existed to resolve jurisdictional
disputes before 1968.
2. Background of Article V
The Union contends that the local unions and Industrial
Relations Department resolved jurisdictional disputes before
1968 as follows:
1.

A 1963 dispute developed between the Carpenters and

Boilersmakers concerning wood veneer.

The Union argues that it

notified the Company that the work should be reassigned to the
Carpenters; that the Company did so; and that the Company recognized the Union's right or practice to decide jurisdiction regarding work assignments.
2.

A 1966 dispute arose between the Carpenters and Boiler-

makers concerning sound dampening.

The Union maintains that the

two unions and the Company failed to resolve the dispute voluntarily.

Consequently, the Union states that the Boilermakers

grieved, after having rejected the Company proposal that would
have resulted in the work being assigned to the Carpenters.

As

a result, the Boilermakers proceeded to arbitration (which the
Union characterizes as an "unfortunate situation") essentially
against the Carpenters, despite the MTC's preference to avoid
arbitration and the
tration award.

MTC's unwillingness to be bound by an arbi-

The Union explains that the locals preferred to

decide the dispute themselves without the intervention of a third
party.

Accordingly, the Union explains that the President of

the Metal Trades Department of the AFL-CIO met with the union

officials and suggested that a joint board be created to decide
such disputes.

Thus the 1968 collective bargaining agreement

contained Appendix A for the first time, which the Union attributes to a desire by the unions to "put the people in occupational titles that were represented by the proper unions that had
jurisdiction of the occupational title."

(Union Brief at 12.)

The Union continues that the Company sought some flexibility in
1967 regarding certain situations, but the parties failed to reach
an agreement.
Several arbitrations arose which the Union analyzes as
follows:
1.

An award dated October 31, 1967 by Arbitrator Shipman

addressed the assignment of uncrating work.

The Arbitrator con-

sidered the argument by the Company that it had retained the
management prerogative to make such assignments.

Arbitrator

Shipman included the following conclusions in the Award:
a) separate wage rates amount to contractual
recognition that work content of each craft
is unique;
b) the Company is not to indiscriminately
assign work across craft lines;
c) jurisdictional lines are to be respected;
d) work jurisdiction cannot be established
unilaterally by unions; and
e) claims to jurisdiction must be reasonable
and consistent with industrial realities while
mindful of existing jurisdictional lines.
2. An arbitration award dated February 20, 1968 by Arbitrate
Leo Brown concerned sound dampening.

The Award held that the Com-

pany could determine which craft could perform specific work
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despite contractual recognition of certain trades and crafts.
The Award also found contractual recognition of a distinction
regarding skills.

Management discretion to make work assignments,

therefore, could be limited if the Company based the decision on
an improper purpose such as discrimination or an attempt to avoid
payment of a higher wage to the craft that normally performed the
work.

Arbitrator Brown observed that, "the right of exclusive

work jurisdiction, if it exists, is to be found not in the agreement but in past practice."

(Union Brief at 15.)

Against the backdrop of these arbitrations, the Union claims
that the MTC sought to avoid the sound dampening situation where
one union would challenge another union in arbitration over a
Company work assignment.
Article V Negotiations
The Union relates that 1968 negotiations began in April.
According to the Union, the Company attempted to resolve problems concerning a wildcat strike and jurisdiction.

The Union

first conveyed a proposal to deal with jurisdiction on May 14,
1968.

The Union deems the key features of the proposal to be

that:
1.

the proposal specified the "locals of the Unions;"

2.

the proposal encompassed jurisdiction of work assign-

ments in occupational
3.

titles;

the proposal did not apply only to the Schedule of

Occupational Titles (subsequently Appendix A);
4.

the proposal indicated that disputes would be

resolved by AFL-CIO Metal Trades Department policy;
5.

the proposal allocated the MTC with the duty to

prevent work stoppages concerning jurisdictional disputes;
6.

the proposal anticipated an MTC seven person committee
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and, if necessary, the International Unions to resolve
jurisdictional disputes;
7.

the proposal required all parties to be bound; and

8.

MTC President Anthony L. DeGregory signed the proposal.

The Union maintains that the Company objected to the prominence
of the local unions, rather than the MTC.
a second proposal dated May 21, 1968.

The Union then submitted

The Union considers the

most important parts of this proposal to be that:
1. the agreement is with the MTC and the affiliated
local unions;
2. references to jurisdiction of work assignments are
not limited by the Schedule of Titles;
3. the Employer or a local union may give notice of a
dispute;
4. the MTC appoints a committee whose size is not specified;
5. decisions are required within seven days and are
effective until amended or ratified by the International
Unions;
6. there are to be no work stoppages but primary responsibility is not given to the MTC;
7. all parties are to be bound.
The Union insists that neither proposal suggests that the Union
is only limited to determining which union a worker, who is
assigned to perform certain work, must join.

The Union considered

this view to be supported by the concern D.C. Wilkens, Director
of Industrial Relations and the chief Company spokesman, expressed
over decisions that the Union would make under the procedure.
The Union thinks Wilkens1 concern refutes the Company's stance
in the instant arbitration that Article V merely would require

-11an already employed worker to join a certain union for a period
of time.

In answering the Company response, the Union contends

that it replied that the dealings among the local unions and the
participation of the International Unions would guarantee fair
determinations.
The Union differentiates between jurisdiction over work
and transfering union membership.

For example, the Union illus-

trates its understanding of the meaning of jurisdiction by referring to a decision from the National Board for Settlement of
Jurisdictional Disputes, Building and Construction Industry
(Union Exhibit 31) which assigned the disputed work—not the
worker—to the Carpenters.
The Union asserts that the contents of the June 11, 1968 minutes
from the 1968 negotiations, compiled by Charles A. Petchark,
Chief of Labor Relations and previously Recording Secretary of
the Metal Trades Council from 1967 to 1971, (Union Exhibit 52),
do not support the Company's interpretation of Article V.

Further

more, in addressing the effect of a possible consolidation of job
titles on Electronic Technicians and Mechanics, the Union reasons
that an exchange involving Bill Kelly of the Electricians Union,
Phil Stone of the Industrial Relations Department and Charles
Jones, Superintendent of the Electronics Department, manifested
an understanding that after the consolidation had occurred interchanges would be prohibited even in the event of a lay off.

The

Union considers this discussion to be consistent with its theory
of the case, namely, that the parties did not negotiate a provision merely calling for an interchangeability of union membership .
The Union claims that the Company presented a proposal
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to the Union on June 11, 1968 that provided for involvement by
the Company in the resolution of jurisdictional disputes.

The

Union differs with the Company regarding whether the Company
actually exchanged a proposal dated June 30, 1968.

The Union

asserts that the Company submitted the proposal to the Union
despite the Company's denial and the legend "NOT APPROVED FOR
USE" that appears on the document.

(See Union Exhibit 32.)

The

Union urges that: 1) the Company prepared the document; 2) the
contents of the document reflected the Company's position; and
3) the Company probably submitted the document to the Union.

The 1

Union views the following provisions of the proposal as being
significant:
1. the MTC is the other party;
2. there are detailed procedures to resolve

jurisdictional

disputes;
3. disputes embrace only work assignments covered by
occupational titles;
4. the local union provides notice of a dispute;
5. the MTC President advises the Company of a dispute
and seeks a meeting of the Joint Jurisdictional Dispute
Committee;
6. the Committee contains three representatives

from the

Union and three representatives from the Company;
7. deadlocks of the Committee are referred to the
International Representatives who meet with representives of the Company;
8. arbitration would be used to resolve disputes that
could not be settled;
9. there would be no work stoppages over

jurisdictional

disputes and the assignment by the Company would continue
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pending a resolution as described above.
The Union considers the origins of a fourth proposal dated
July 6, 1968 to be unclear.

The absence of the Company legend

and the absence of DeGregory's signature are viewed by the Union
as evidence of the uncertainty about which party authored the
proposal.

The Union recognizes that DeGregory testified that

the Union had presented the proposal whereas Petchark testified
that the Company had done so.

As the parties ultimately adopted

the proposal, the Union points to the absence of any indication
that it is limited to only what local an employee would be required to join while performing work assigned by the Company.
If the Company did propose the language contained in the proposal,
the Union submits

it did not reflect the Company's current inter-

pretation of the provision.

In either event, the Union identifies

the following important aspects of the proposal:
1. the provision covers the MTC and the local unions;
2. the provision refers to the jurisdiction of occupational titles contained in Appendix A;
3. either the employer or a local union may provide
notice of a dispute;
4. the MTC appoints a committee that is not described
in terms of size or membership;
5. the MTC issues an interim decision;
6. the committee decision is made within seven calendar
days and applies unless amended or ratified by the International Unions involved;
7. the work is performed according to the assignment of
the employer until the Committee acts; and
8. all parties are bound.
The Union asserts that none of the four proposals indicates
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that the Company intended to retain such broad authority regarding work assignments.

In contrast, the Union insists that the

complex jurisdictional relationships between and among the Unions
constituted an important issue to the Union and that the Union
would not alter longstanding practices or concepts because of
practical constraints involving the local unions.

Furthermore,

the Union discredits Petchark's testimony because he did not disclose in that testimony what his understanding was before he left
the MTC to join Management, and because his testimony—that
management representatives Wilkens, Phil Stone (Manager of Labor
Relations), and Charles Oles (Corporate Director of Labor Relations) , had stated in the 1968 negotiations that Article V would
enable the Union to decide which local union would represent
employees who performed work that the Company had assigned—is
not corroborated through any documents, minutes, or other witnesses .
The Union emphasizes that typed transcripts of the June 12,
1968 jurisdictional committee discussions indicate that Boilermakers International Representative Williams responded to an inquiry from Wilkens that the discussion involved work performed
and not union representation.

The Union concedes that the minutes

are not conclusively supportive of either side's position.

But

the Union criticizes the Company's silence about what it now
claims to have been its understanding about Article V.

The Union

also contests the Company's position by claiming a Company admission that the documents prepared by the Union during the 1968
negotiations omit any reference limiting MTC's rights under
Article V to require employees to pay dues to a particular local
union.

Likewise, the Union argues that such an interpretation
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after the parties adopted Article V and after several MTC
decisions pursuant to Article V.

Specifically, the Union refers

to Company Exhibit 23 dated May 5, 1970 (which responded to MTC
Jurisdictional Dispute Decision No. 7) as inconsistent with the
Company's position in the instant arbitration.

The Union con-

siders the assignment of work within the STO occupational title
from one trade to another to be different than assigning work
that is normally performed by a Carpenter to an STO Machinist.
Also, the response by the Company to the 1972 grievance in the
instant matter, according to the Union, coincides with the Company's
current reading of Article V.

The Company's present position,

the Union claims, first developed during the federal litigation.
Jurisdictional Disputes--Generally
The Union contends that the contamination-containment

dis-

pute arose four years after the negotiation of Article V and that
the Company did not challenge the Union's Article V authority at
first.

Instead, the Union argues that the Company acknowledged

that Memorandum of Understanding Y--which subsequently became
Memorandum of Understanding No. 37 entitled "Con Con Bags"-would govern.

This shift by the Company away from Article V is

perceived by the Union as fatal to the Company's position and as
recognition by the Company of the Union's exclusive control over
jurisdiction pursuant to Article V.
The Union challenges the testimony of Petchark on the following grounds: the 1968 negotiations constituted his first negotiations; his testimony is uncorroborated because the Company's
minutes of the 1968 negotiations allegedly no longer exist; he
now is employed by management whereas he then served as Recording Secretary of the MTC; he could not recall certain procedures
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that the parties followed during the negotiations; his testimony
is inconsistent with respect to the typing of certain items; he
could not recall discussing the meaning of Article V with DeGregory;
and he did not recall certain specific disputes.

The Union

judges his testimony to be "colored by his switching sides in
1971 and his rapid rise to the top of management . . . . "
(Union Brief at 31.)
Furthermore, the Union disagrees with the testimony of
Petchark with respect to certain other events.

The Union dis-

putes his conclusion that the Company articulated its position
that the Union had improperly interpreted Article V, because there
is no documentation for over four years, no corroboration from
other witnesses, and no indication that Petchark told DeGregory
of the alleged error.

In fact, the Union depicts Petchark as

having exaggerated the number of union officials he claims to
have told that the Union improperly interpreted Article V before
he departed from the MTC in 1971 for a management position.

The

Union considers Petchark's role in investigating and resolving
the first jurisdictional dispute in September 1968--in which
Petchark allegedly notified DeGregory that the Boilermakers had
historically performed certain work rather than the Painters
(Union Exhibit 22)--to be consistent with the Union's version of
the meaning of Article V.
The Union also asserts that the Company complied with other
Article V determinations by the Union.

As to the procedure that

the Union followed pursuant to Article V, it points out that
DeGregroy and Petchark initially administered the provision.

In

some cases the Union submits that: (1) joint meetings were held
to provide an opportunity for positions to be discussed;

they

met with the local unions involved in the dispute; and (3) they
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held discussions with workers concerning the dispute. The Union
maintains that the Article V Committee was expanded in size
and that the Company failed to complain about the workings of
the Committee until after the court litigation began in 1974.
In rejecting Petchark's testimony, the Union relies on the
testimony of DeGregory.

DeGregory testified that the Company

did not profess its right to assign work, subject to the Union's
subsequent right to decide which local union would represent the
worker affected.

More particularly, the Union relies on DeGregory's

testimony that the Company could assign work within an occupational title but not out of craft.

Furthermore, the Union contends

that the Company complied with the early Article V awards as
evidenced by the lack of Company objection or response regarding
Union determinations in approximately 40 matters. As the Company
complied with those MTC decisions, the Union explains such
decisions had not become well known because the grievance procedure was avoided.
In the opinion of the Union, an example of the Union determining a work assignment involved the travel crane.

In response

to a request by the Company in 1976 to decide which local union
would represent the job, the Union asserts that it decided the
Teamsters would do so.

The Union stresses that this decision

mandated a reassignment of the disputed work.

Unlike the travel

crane situation, the Union contends that Union Exhibit 11-31,
Company Exhibit 19, and Company Exhibit 20 did not involve jurisdictional disputes because of the absence of more than one union
competing for the work.

The Union concedes that the Company

opposed the Union's decision in 1970 regarding certain grinding
work which the Machinists and Boilermakers has sought.

Never-

theless, the Union dismisses the Company's conduct as irrelevant,
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by pointing out that the Company's position—that "it is a
management right to assign employees within an occupational title
to a work assignment as lead trade" and that an "assignment could
change responsibilities 'at the discretion of management from
time to time as has always been the practice 1 " (Company brief
at 36, emphasis omitted)-- dealt with intra-occupational
work assignments, and not with the facts of the instant dispute.
Similarly, the Union rejects Petchark's testimony that the record
in connection with a July 2, 1969 grievance filed by the Union
(Company Exhibit 18) constituted the Company's first written
communication of its current reading of Article V.
denies that this grievance involved a jurisdictional

The Union
dispute.

In the alternature it argues that, even if it did, the Company's
silence for one year—during which the parties adjusted a number
of jurisdictional disputes pursuant to the Union's understanding
of Article V--undermines the Company's attempt to prove its
current position.

The Union considers significant the Company's

admission that no MTC documents suggest the Company's interpretation of Article V.

In addition, the Union analyzes as weak the

testimony of Petchark that on June 29, 1970 the Company began
delineating the scope of Article V to be narrow (i.e. merely a
way for the Union to arrange for representation of an employee
by" a local union after the Company had assigned the work) because
the Company failed to convey such an interpretation
in writing.

to the Union

Although the Company may have discussed the contents

of Company Exhibit 27 verbally with the Union, the Union considers
this conversation, if in fact it occurred, to be of no probative
value due to the Company's unusual failure to confirm the conversation with the Union in writing.

The Union also challenges the

Company's position because the Company opposed a jurisdictional
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claim by several unions concerning a laundry monitor, by insisting that Article V did not apply but without mentioning that
Article V could be used to arrange union membership.

Aside from

the litigation that led to the instant arbitration, the Union
maintains that not until November 16, 1977 did the Company first
convey in writing its interpretation of Article V.
The Union highlights the 1967 Shipman Award as evidence
that the Union considered the Company's attempt to encroach upon the Union's work jurisdiction as unacceptable.

Therefore,

the Union repudiates the suggestion by the Company that the Union
would have or did, in essence, relinquish its concern over this
critical area by agreeing to Article V as interpreted by the
Company.

In citing the Shipman Award, the Union underscores

that in that case the arbitrator found that "work jurisdiction
cannot be unilaterally established by unions" (Union Brief at
40, citing Company Exhibit 38 at 9-12).

In that regard, the

Union points out that it did not unilaterally assign contamination containment bag work to the Carpenters.

Instead, the Union

claims the Company acknowledges jurisdiction when it, not the
Union, as a matter of practice assigned the work to the Carpenters on a volunteer basis before 1971 and on a mandatory training basis thereafter.
The Union differs with the Company over the Company's view
that either 1) the Union retreated from the pre-Article V safeguards to union work jurisdiction recognized by Arbitrator
Shipman; or 2) that the Company retained an inherent management
right over work assignments.

To bolster its positions, the Union

distinguishes the disputes encompassed by Company Exhibits 52,
53, and 54 as not- involving Article V jurisdictional disputes
because in each instance the grievance did not involve more than
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one local union.
The Union challenges the testimony of Petchark that the
Company did not comply with Article V determinations by the MTC.
For instance, the Union cites Union Exhibit 57, which involved
a jurisdictional dispute between the Machinists and the Boilermakers, as evidence that Petchark knew in fact that the Company
had complied with decisions by the MTC pursuant to Article V.
In particular, the Union quotes page 3 of Union Exhibit 57,
written by Petchark in July 1970, when he was MTC Recording
Secretary, which provides, "the parties mutually agree that the
Company is complying with the intent of jurisdictional dispute
number 12/3 as awarded by the MTC, in accordance with Article V."
(Union Brief at 41, quoting Union Exhibit 57 at 3.) In addition,
the Union considers Petchark's involvement with this matter as
evidence inconsistent with his testimony that he had limited
contact with jurisdictional disputes.
The Con-Con Bags Jurisdictional
Dispute
The Union asserts that the merits of the MTC Article V
Committee decision is not subject to a de novo review in arbitration.

Article V is viewed by the Union as including sufficient

safeguards against arbitrary or capricious decisions by the Union
because the Company may provide information to the Article V
Committee and the decisions of the Committee may be reviewed by
the International Unions.

In addition, the Union claims that the

Committee merely adhered to traditional craft practices by not
permitting, in this case, the STO Department and the Company to
avoid paying the Carpenters the 17<; premium required by the
collective bargaining agreement.
The Union contends that the issues to be resolved in arbitration are:
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1.

Whether two or more locals claimed the work;

2.

Whether the dispute was submitted to the MTC;

3.

Whether the MTC complied with Article V in
deciding the dispute;

4.

Whether the Company violated the MTC decision;
and

5.

What are the damages sustained by the Union and
what shall be the remedy.

More particularly, the Union emphasizes that it would be improper
for the merits of the MTC decision to be considered in arbitration because, Article V, as negotiated by the parties, forbids
such a review.
The Union relates that the instant case arose in 1972 when
employees, other than Carpenters, installed con-con bags shortly
after the parties had neogitated a 17£ premium for the Carpenters,
The Union notes that the Company responded that the STO employees
--Electricians, Machinists, and Pipefitters--had not complained
and that the Company deemed it more convenient to assign the
work to the STO employees.

The Union relies on a conversation

between Roger Dawley, Business Representative of the Carpenters
Local 1302 and John Reed, Chief Steward of the Machinists, during
which Reed indicated that the Machinists possessed the requisite
qualifications to perform the work and that the Machinists therefore had a right to perform the work.

As a consequence, a letter

dated November 3, 1972 from Dawley to DeGregory (see Company
Exhibit 11-31) invoked Article V according to the Union.

The

Carpenters did not file a grievance because the Union views
Article VI, Section 9 of the 1968 contract to preclude access to
the grievance machinery for jurisdictional disputes.

The Union

indicates that DeGregory notified the Company of the problem and
Joseph W. Messier, Recording Secretary of the Metal Trades Council,
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and he investigated the dispute for the MTC.

After reiterating

that the Machinists had claimed the work and that the Pipefitters
would do so if they could, the Union indicates that the MTC informed the Company on November 10, 1972 that, "CON-CON bag work
had historically been performed by Carpenters and, therefore,
requested cooperation in seeing that it continued to be assigned
to Local 1302 . . . . " (Union Brief at 47, emphasis in original.)
The Union argues that the Company then denied violating the contamination containment memorandum of understanding on the basis
that the installation of Herculite bags did not constitute such
a breach.

Furthermore, the Union concludes that the Company

thereby recognized that STO employees should not be installing
con-con bags or Type IV bags.

In addition, the Union disavows

any claim by the Carpenters to the installation of Herculite bags
which the Union distinguishes from con-con bags.

The Union

comments that DeGregory notified the Company on November 22, 1972
about the Company's lack of control over the Union's decision
pursuant to Article V.

The Union continues that the Company re-

sponded on November 27, 1972 by denying that an Article V issue
existed with the MTC and by declaring that con-con bags would be
handled according to the memorandum of understanding.

The Union

observes that the Company failed to suggest in 1972 that the
Union had erred in interpreting Article V or that the Union merely could require the STO employees who installed con-con bags to
join the Carpenters Union.
The Merits of the Jurisdictional Dispute
Award to the Carpenters
The Union asserts that it had advised the Company of the
Article V dispute.

The Union contends that the Machinists claim-

ed the work and that the MTC Committee considered the significance

-23-

of the 17<; premium.

With respect to the negotiation procedure

used during collective bargaining, the Union indicates that each
local union negotiates as a separate subcommittee—although
DeGregory would serve on the subcommittee

as a representative

of the MTC--regarding issues that only involve that local union.
The Union acknowledges that DeGregory did not consider the 1966
Zack arbitration award and distinguishes that award as having
involved a one day assignment in 1965 when Carpenters volunteered for con-con bag training.

Furthermore, the Union points out

that the Company failed to propose to DeGregory or the Union that
the Zack Award be considered.

In reaching its decision, the

Union emphasizes that it relied upon the past practice of the
Carpenters having performed the disputed work. Thus the Union
relies on the practice of Carpenters erecting Type IV con-con
bags with zippers before 1972.

The Union renounces any claim to

installing Glad type or Herculite bags. The Union notes that the
Article V Committee examined the different types of bags in
November 1972.
Contamination Containment
Bag Exhibits
The Union cites the Company answer to the MTC con-con bag
decision in an effort to define the dispute with greater precision:
There has been no violation of Memo of
Understanding Y - CON-CON bags. Department 397, STO, has the responsibility of
securing certain components with Herculite
bags which in no way should be construed
to be an infringement on our joint agreement as set forth in Memo of Understanding
Y.
The Union concurs with this statement but maintains that the
Company's conduct did not conform to the representations contained in its answer.

The Union denies that the Carpenters are

seeking jurisdiction over the installation of Herculite bags,
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which the Union describes as "a yellow 4-mil polyurethane bag
18" to 20" square, similar to what you would have in a kitchen,
similar to a 'Glad' bag.

It has no sleeves in it." (Union Brief

at 51.) Consequently, the Union reasons that the instant matter
could end if the Company disclaimed the right to direct STO employees to install any thing other than the yellow Herculte bags.
According to the Union, the yellow Herculte 4-mil bag is not
synonymous with a con-con bag or secondary containment.

The

Union asserts that the term "secondary containment" first appeared in a Company manual in May 1973 and next in a memorandum in
July 1973.

The Union maintains that the following bags are ex-

amples of Carpenters' work:
1) Secondary containment-modified muff
bag (installed or constructed by Carpenters before 1973 and not called "secondary containments" before 1973);
2) split tapers sleeve containments (installed by Carpenters before 1973 and not
called "secondary containments" before
1973);
3) type IV con-con bags (Union Exhibit 13
and Union Exhibit 16 which existed before
1972 and which Carpenters installed before
and after 1972) ;
4) Union Exhibit 17 and Union Exhibit 18
(installed by Carpenters before and after
1972); and
5) Company Exhibits 7, 8, 9, and 10 (regularly installed by Carpenters and which are
either Type IV bags or modifications of Type
IV bags).
The Union indicates that STO employees installed certain bags,
as reflected

in Company Exhibit 8, before 1972.

In contrast,

the Union recounts that STO employees installed all of these
bags after 1972.

Accordingly, Company Exhibits 7, 9, and 10

are the bags that are in dispute as far as the Union is concerned.

(Union Reply Brief at 32).
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The critical difference between various bags, according
to the Union, is the accessibility.

On the basis of this factor,

in essence, the Union compares various bags:
1)Company Exhibit 7 is not a modified
Type IV bag;
2) Union Exhibit 18 Figure 7 resembles
Company Exhibit 10 more than it resembles Company Exhibit 7; and
3) Company Exhibit 7 is called a glove
bag.
The Union notes that Peter A. Cawley, Chief of Radiological
Control, considered Company Exhibit 7 to be similar to Union
Exhibit 18 Figure 7.

From 1966 to 1972 the Union alleges that

only Carpenters installed the bags represented in Company Exhibits 7, 9, and 10.

In addition, the Union submits that Carpen-

ters installed Company Exhibit 7 bags after 1972. In contrast,
the Union confirms that STO employees installed Company Exhibit
8 bags--glad bags or Herculite bags—before 1972. The Union
comments that Company Exhibit 8 bags are no longer used.

The

Union points out that Company Exhibit 9, however, is a modified
Type IV bag which did not exist before 1972 and which is similar
to Company Exhibit 7 and Company Exhibit 10 while different from
Company Exhibit 8.

Furthermore, the Union claims that Company

Exhibit 9 and Company Exhibit 10 represent modifications to Type
IV bags as reflected in Union Exhibit 16 and that the STO employees
have installed these bags since 1972. With respect to Union Exhibit 18, the Union considers Type IV bags to be similar to
Company Exhibit 10 and contends that neither bag existed before
1972.
Con-Con Bag History
The Union relates that before 1965 the Carpenters received
special training to install and to remove nuclear contamination
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bags on a volunteer basis.

This situation changed according

to the Union when the Company created a special budget for such
work and assigned such work to the Carpenters on an exclusive
basis.

(Union Brief at 55, citing Union Exhibit 3.)

The Union

comments that the Zack Award addressed this situation and found
that such exclusive jurisdiction did not exist for the Carpenters.

Nevertheless, the Union analyzes the record as revealing

that only Carpenters performed the work involving nu-con bags
or con-con bags from the date of the Zack Award until 1972-albeit after training on a volunteer basis.

In the opinion of

the Union, a change developed in 1971 when the Company explored
the possibility of Carpenters performing such work on a mandatory basis.

Thereafter, the Union asserts that the parties

used the language of the exploratory memorandum--Union Exhibit
4 dated March 5, 1971--as the basis for Memorandum of Understanding 37 which incorporated training requirements and the
17<; premium.

The Union recounts that the Carpenters observed

non-carpenters performing con-con bag work in October 1972 and
this occurrence led to the instant grievance.

For example, the

Union contends that STO employees installed Type IV bags (Union
Exhibit 18) since November 1972.

In addition, the Union empha-

sizes that no other trade received the 17£ premium.

Even when

an STO employee installed a con-con bag, the Union attests that
the Carpenters still tested the bag, issued the bag, and maintained surveillance of the bag.
The Union relies upon the testimony of Raymond A. Winklebeck,
(a Radiological Control Monitor), Dawley, and Cawley--that STO
employees installed bags other than Herculite bags after October
l972--to refute the claim by the Company that STO employees have
performed "the same 'contamination device' work from the mid
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(Union Brief at 57-58.)

The Union underscores that the Carpenters desired to have
total control over the Con-Con bags because of problems that
might otherwise arise involving faulty work.

On the other hand,

the Union submits that the Company focused solely on the "convenienceof using Type IV bags in place of the 4-mil bag because
of the easy access into the bag with a zipper."

(Union Brief

at 59, emphasis in original.)
The Union views the Company's denial of grievance MTC-5384, filed on behalf of the DeCon Technicians, as evidence that
the parties intended the 17C premium, provided for in Memorandum
of Understanding 37, to be only for Carpenters.
17C Premium—1972 Contract
The Union asserts that Memorandum of Understanding 37, contained in the 1972 contract, arose from a Company Memorandum
dated March 5, 1971.

The Union traces the bargaining history

for this provision as follows:
1) Petchark met with representatives of
the Carpenters on February 4, 1971;
2) the parties discussed voluntary training and mandatory training;
3) the parties discussed the exposure of
employees to radiation;
4) Petchark noted that testing should not
be done by STO employees;
5) the parties discussed the level of skill
that is needed to install the bags;
6) the Carpenters sought total control over
the bags; and
7) Company representative Norman Hilbert,
(Chief of Radiological Control) recognized
the interest of other locals in the work
and admitted that "this would be a violation
of the current agreement."
(Union Brief at
63, citing transcript 5-63.)
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Carpenters, the Union submits that only the Carpenters performed
con-con bag work at the time and that the entire MTC voted to
seek premium pay for the Carpenters during the contract negotiations.

The absence of representatives from other locals during

the negotiation of Memorandum of Understanding 37 is viewed by
the Union as further evidence of the fact that the parties intended this provision to only cover Carpenters.

The Union re-

veals that the parties followed the same procedure during negotia
tions involving Linesmen and Model Joiners because only the
Carpenters had an interest in resolving these matters.

The Union

deems this procedure to be consistent with its understanding that
the parties already had resolved the exclusivity issues in
February 1971.

The Union regards the negotiations for the 17£

premium for Carpenters as a significant factor in the determination by the MTC Article V Committee concerning con-con bag work.
The Union observes that its interpreation is supported by the
Company's refusal to pay non carpenters—DeCon technicians and
STO employees--the 17<; premium.
Consistent Preservation of Craft
Jurisdiction at General Dynamics
The Union insists that it sought control over jurisdiction
during the 1968 negotiations.

This position by the Union is re-

flected in the following statement by a union official to Wilkens
"What the hell do you care who does the work as long as it gets
done." (Union Brief at 65, quoting transcript at 2-70) .

The

Union emphasizes that the Company never disclosed during the
1968 negotiations that it considered Article V to permit the
Company to assign the work, leaving it to the Union to decide
which local union would represent the employees.

After review-

ing certain evidence about the Company's control within an

-28occupational title and the Shipman arbitration award, the Union
reasons that the unsuccessful attempt by the Company to secure
more favorable language in 1967 concerning work assignments constitutes evidence that the Company knew it lacked such authority.
Similarly, the Union relies on the Brown Award as evidence that
the Company lacked complete discretion because of craft jurisdiction considerations.

The Union also refers to the Santer

Award as evidence of the Union's concern to preserve craft union
principles. To clarify the relationship of Article XL, the Union
notes that Article XL is applicable when no other local union is
disputing the work assignment.

As further evidence of the Union1

concern about Article XL, the Union asserts that the first sixteen weeks of the strike that occurred in connection with the
1975 negotiations addressed Article XL issues.

The parties

ultimately resolved the dispute and adopted Memorandum 40 according to the Union.

In doing so, the Union contends that the

Company denied an interest in obtaining "interchangeability"
whereby each of two crafts routinely perform work across craft
lines.

The Union insists that it consistently monitored this

issue as reflected by its previous concern during the 1968
negotiations

over interchangeability and trade union integrity.

Memorandum No. 1 in the 1972-1975 agreement is cited by the Union
as evidence of special negotiated concessions to enable management to obtain flexibility in radiation areas.

Furthermore, the

Union points to the 1982-1985 collective bargaining agreement
concerning "Union-Employer Cooperation in Craft Jurisdiction
and Work Practices" as well as Memorandum of Understanding 11 to
highlight the ongoing commitment to craft jurisdiction.
The Union submits that it recognized the need of management for flexibility by agreeing to Article 29 which provided a
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It is the opin-

ion of the Union that the Company could have invoked Article 29
if it needed revisions of the work practices involving con-con
bags.
Additional Contentions
1.

The Union maintains that the Arbitrator must not con-

sider the merits of the work assignment because of the design of
Article V and that any dissatisfaction the Company may have with
Article V is a matter for collective bargaining rather than arbitration.
2.

To sustain the Company's position, the Union claims

that the clause "jurisdictional disputes" in Article V would have
to be interpreted to mean "designation of union representation
rather than control over work assignments . . . ." (Union Reply
Brief at 3.)
3.

The Union views the Charm Award which dealt with senior

ity as irrelevent to Article V and work assignments.
4.

The Union emphasizes that the parties omitted the

language "work assignments" from Article V because Appendix A
provided greater specificity by defining the various occupational titles.
5.

The Union deems the prompt filing of jurisdictional

disputes by the Union within one month after ratification of
the 1968 agreement, and the failure of the Company to contest in
writing the Union's understanding of this provision, to be evidence that the current position of the Company differs from the
understanding of the Company in 1968.
6.

The Union notes that grievance settlements that arose

from the realignments of union membership in 1968 do not involve
Article V which is excluded from the scope of the grievance
procedure.
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The Union specifies that grievances are filed by re-

ferring to a number of Articles to satisfy time limits in the
contract and that the recitation of a number of Articles does
not reflect confusion by the Union.

Instead, the Union argues

that the better way to determine whether there is confusion is
to study which Articles the Union pursues in connection with the
grievances.
8.

The Union regards the use of the "Type IV" label as a

way to identify any model containment.
9.

The Union dismisses the arguments of the Company as

untimely because the Company had the opportunity to raise them
in 1972 before the MTC decision but chose not to do so.
Based on all of these factors, the Union contends the grievance should be sustained; that the parties be directed to confer
about damages; and that the arbitrator resume the proceedings if
the parties are unable to resolve the issue of damages.
CONTENTIONS OF THE EMPLOYER
The Employer set forth the following arguments in support
of its position:
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
It is the position of the Company that the grievance is
arbitrable to the extent that the Company made certain representations to Judge Zampano in connection with Civil Action N74-62 (Joint Exhibit 5).

In this regard, the Company maintains

that the grievance is arbitrable "only to the extent that it
charged the Company with a violation of Article V and only insofar as it alleged a violation of the 1972-1975 Agreement."
(Company Brief at 1.)
In connection with the federal litilation, the Company
argued that Article V did not vest the MTC with power regarding
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work assignments.

Instead, the Company viewed Article V as a

mechanism for the MTC to determine which local union would represent employees to whom the Company had assigned partical work.
The Company also urged Judge Zampano to rule that an arbitrator
rather than the Court should interpret the meaning of Article V.
INTRODUCTORY ARGUMENT
The Company stresses the critical importance of this case
and the concomitant need for the Union position to be rejected
by the Arbitrator.

The Company characterizes the Union theory

of the case as leading to "unfettered and unreviewable control
over work assignments" by the Union.

(Company Brief at 3.)

Furthermore, the Company objects to the possibility that frivolous claims by one or more locals concerning a work assignment
could oust the Company from control over such a work assignment.
Thus the Company interprets the impact of the Union argument as
providing the Union with the ability to shift work from one
occupational title to another, and to dictate rates of pay,
assignment of overtime, and premium trade status.

Similarly,

the Company asserts that the Union would be able to eliminate
special contractual provisions concerning work assignments in
radiation areas and incidental work assignments.

The record in

the instant case typifies to the Company the excesses that the
Union could engage in if the Union prevails.
I. The Meaning of Article V
A. The Award by Arbitrator Sumner Charm
The Company contends that the 1967 arbitration award rendered by Sumner Charm is relevant.

Specifically, the Company re-

lies upon Charm's interpretation of Article VII of the 1965-1968
collective bargaining agreement requiring seniority for layoff
purposes to be calculated on time within each occupational sub-
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for the ultimate inclusion of Article V in the 1968-1972 collective bargaining agreement.

By sustaining the Company's inter-

pretation of how seniority should be calculated, the Company
considers the Charm Award to have prompted the Union to pursue
efforts to overcome the decision.

The Company credits the Charm

Award as having exposed several deficiencies of the 1965-1968
agreement, namely: (1) the omission of a list correlating occupational titles for jurisdictional purposes and the corresponding local unions; (2) the failure to specify which local the
Agreement required an employee to join; (3) the practice of
having employees in different occupational subdivisions

perform-

ing the same work; (4) the problem of an employee changing from
one occupational subdivision to another without changing local
union representation; and (5) the possibility of an employee
being laid off after an extended length of service in a department while an employee with a limited length of service in a
different occupational subdivision within the same department
continued to work.
B. The International

Union Advisory

Committee

The Company claims that the MTC formed an Advisory Committee of International

Representatives of its constituent locals

to deal with the seniority issue by pursuing an alignment process whereby:

(1) specific locals would establish jurisdiction

over certain occupational

subdivisions; (2) appropriate

adjust-

ments in local representation would be made; and (3) a clarification and stabilization of union representation

of employees

would offset the most unacceptable aspects of the Charm Award.
In reviewing the Committee's activities, the Company relies upon the testimony of Petchark that the Company permitted
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determinations "provided that there was no change in the work
performed by the people.:
script at 4/127.)

(Company Brief at 6 citing trans-

The Company underscores the testimony of

Petchark that the Company did not oppose the adjustment in the
union affiliation of approximately 600 employees because no
change in work assignments had occurred.
C. The 1968 Contract Negotiations
1.

Article V

The Company contends that the 1968 contract negotiations
incorporated the activities of the Advisory Committee.

Accord-

ing to the Company, the Union sought contractual language to
continue the activities of the Advisory Committee, namely, to
provide a means to place employees under the appropriate union
representation.

The Company maintains that Article V became the

key provision of the contract concerning this subject.
The bargaining history set forth by the Company is as
follows: the Union submitted two proposals that contained language "with respect to the jurisdiction of any work assignment
in occupational titles."

(Company Brief at 7.)

The Company

presented one counter-proposal that deleted the "work assignment"
phrase from the two Union proposals.

The Company highlights the

significance of this deletion as evidence that the Company had
rejected the Union attempt to secure power over work assignments.
(See Company Reply Brief at 1.)

Similarly, the Company points

to the testimony that the Company negotiators told the Union
negotiators that Article V "could be used only 'to determine
which Union would represent employees who had been assigned to
perform work by the Company.1"
in original.)

(Company Brief at 9, emphasis

The Company insists that the parties agreed to
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negotiations, constituted the understanding of the parties.

The

Company disputes the Union's reliance on a document dated June
30, l968--that includes a heading, "Company Proposal-Not Approved
for Use," (Union Exhibit 32)--because the Company did not submit
such a proposal during the 1968 negotiations.
2. Appendix A, Article III, and Article XXII, Section 6B
It is the position of the Company that Appendix A reflects
the results of the work of the Advisory Committee insofar as it
lists occupational titles (formerly referred to as occupational
subdivisions) correlated with the local unions for jurisdictional
purposes.

Thus the Company considers Article V to be the vehicle

for subsequent revisions to Appendix A.

The Company identifies

Article III as the procedure to be followed to effectuate transfers of employees between occupational titles and the resulting
shift in membership from one local to another.

In this way, the

Company claims that employees would shift their union affiliation
to the local that represented the occupational title to which
they were transferred.

As a part of this arrangement, the Com-

pany notes that such employees would be permitted to join

the

local only upon tendering the current month's dues; no duty to
pay an initiation fee existed.
The Company further explains that Article XXII, section B
(1)(a) addressed the issue of seniority concerning such transfers
by providing for date-of-hire seniority in the occupational title
to which an employee was transferred after such an employee had
completed six months of service in the new occupational title.
For the initial six months, however, the Company asserts that
the employee retained seniority rights in the original occupational title.
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Memorandum 17 and Memorandum 18

The Company maintains that disputes arose on the Advisory
Committee concerning jurisdiction over the occupational titles
expediter, receiving inspector, and blueprint clerk.

According-

ly, the Company indicates that the parties negotiated Memorandum
17 and Memorandum 18 as a way to resolve these disputes without
delaying the execution of Article V.

The Company points out that

the parties executed Article V, Memorandum 17 and Memorandum 18
on July 12, 1968 and that this common execution date underscores
the connection among these provisions.

Furthermore, the Company

relies on the substantive terms of Memorandum 17 and Memorandum
18 as being consistent with the Company's interpretation of
Article V.

Specifically, the Company reads Memorandum 17 as

follows:
"It is understood and agreed that the
existing application of work performed
by any employee classification Expeditor
shall not be affected in any manner whatsoever as a result of action by the President of the Metal Trades Council or its
committee which resolves the question of
Union representation."
(Company Brief at 11.)
D. Statement of Company Position
During Term of 1968 Agreement
The Company insists that it articulated its interpretation
of Article V when it agreed to the role of the Advisory Committee
before the 1968 negotiations and during the negotiations that led
to the inclusion of Article V in the 1968 collective bargaining
agreement.

In this regard, the Company disputes the claim by

the Union that the Company did not assert this position—that
Article V permits the Union a role concerning union representation and omits any control over work assignments—until the
federal court litigation in 1974 or 1975.

The testimony of

Petchark is cited by the Company as evidence that the Company
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and during the term of the 1968-1972 agreement.

To bolster its

assertion, the Company maintains that the Union acquiesced to
the Company's approach by settling certain grievances.
named Phillip Stone, Manager of Labor Relations

Petchark

Norman Harper,

and Labor Relations Representative John Souza as Company officials
who told him of the Company's understanding of Article V and that
Petchark related that information to other MTC representatives.
The Company therefore stresses that the Union knew the Company
had viewed the Union interpretation of Article V to be wrong.
Furthermore, the Company highlights the testimony of Petchark
that he knew and had told other Union representatives that the
Union was trying to obtain during the term of the contract a right
that it had not secured during the negotiation of the contract.
The Company identifies certain grievance settlements as
support for its understanding of Article V:
1.

The parties settled a grievance dated November 24,

1969 (concerning a misassignment of work of operating
a bridge crane by a machinist and an electrical bridge
crane operator rather than a boilermaker) whereby the
employees who the Company had assigned to perform the
work continued to do so but were required to join
Boilermakers Union.
2.

the

(Company Exhibit 17.)

The parties settled a grievance dated July 2, 1969

(MTC-68) (concerning a misassignment of work to a mechanical inspector rather than to a machinist) whereby
the parties agreed to the Union's request that the
employee involved be required to join
Union.
3.

the Machinists

(Company Exhibit 18.)

The parties settled a grievance dated September
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welding to a welder rather than to a machinist)
whereby the employee who the Company had assigned
to perform the work continued to do so but was
required to join the Machinists Union.

(Company

Exhibit 20.)
The Company considers these cases to be evidence that in
each instance the employee joined a different union in accordance with the Company's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement.

Consequently, in each instance, the Company

attests that it did not change the work assignment as the Union's
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement would have
required.
E. Company Conduct During the 1970's and 1980's
The Company stresses that its conduct before and during
the 1968 contract negotiations, throughout the 1968-1972 contract
period, and throughout the 1970's and 1980's consistently supported its position that Article V did not vest any power with the
MTC concerning work assignments:
1.

With respect to case No. MTC-JD-7 (concerning a pur-

ported jurisdictional dispute over grinding work that involved
the Boilermakers and the Machinists), the Company rejected the
attempt by the MTC to assign such work but instead merely demonstrated its willingness to discuss the problem with the Union.
2.

With respect to certain pending work assignment dis-

putes, the Company expressed its position in a letter from Manager
of Labor Relations Harper to MTC President DeGregory, dated May
5, 1970 (Company Exhibit 23), in which the Company expressed its
position that:
It is a management right to assign employees
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within an occupational title to a work
assignment as lead trade. An assignment may change responsibilities at the
discretion of management from time to time
as has always been the practice.
3.

With respect to work assignment disputes concerning

the installation and fabrication of temporary staging

(Company

Exhibit 24) and the installation of aluminum plates for sound
dampening (Company Exhibit 25), the Company relies upon the testimony of Petchark that Harper reiterated the Company position that
the Company retained the "right to assign work and that Article
V was merely a means of the Union to have individuals be represented by specific locals."
cript at 5/21) .

(Company Brief at 17 citing Trans-

According to the Company, this testimony is

buttressed by a file memorandum that referenced this discussion.
(Company Exhibit 27.)
4.

With respect to an alleged work assignment dispute

concerning the operation of the laundry monitor machine (see
Company Exhibit 28 and Company Exhibit 29), the Company rejected
the attempt by the MTC to require the Company to assign the work
to employees in the occupational title decontamination technician
represented by six locals because the Company considered Article
V to be inapplicable.
5.

With respect to Grievance MTC-647A-7, filed on

September 23, 1977, (concerning a claimed jurisdictional dispute
involving radiological control training classes), the Company
answered the grievance on the basis that the Company retained
exclusive control over the assignment of work.
6.

With respect to Grievance MTC-697A-7, filed on June

23, 1977, (concerning the operation of milling machines), the
Company answered the grievance on the basis that the Company
retained exclusive control over the assignment of work.
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7.

With respect to a claimed Article V dispute concern"
ing the rigging of transfer cars, Thomas A. Sotir, Director of
Industrial Relations, responded to the Union, in a letter dated
August 10, 1978, in which he recited the Company's position that,
"the assignment of work to employees . . . is exclusively the
right of the management . . . . "

He continued that the author-

ity of the Union under Article V "is limited solely to a determination that employees assigned to certain jobs by management
must maintain membership in a particular Local Union."

(Company

Brief at 19, citing Company Exhibit 33.)
8.

With respect to a claimed work assignment involving

Pipefitters

(concerning service requests and the use of CRT

scopes or tab runs), the Company repeated its position that
"the assignment of work to employees . . . is exclusively the
right of the management . . . . " The Company set forth its
view that the MTC Article V Committee "is limited solely to a
determination that employees assigned to certain

jobs by manage-

ment must maintain membership in a particular Local Union."

In

addition, the Company indicated that Article XL and Memorandum
of Understanding 11 covered work jurisdiction disputes between
employees belongs to different Local Unions.

(See Company Brief

at 20, citing Company Exhibit 35.)
Thus it is the position of the Company that there is
not one instance throughout all of the years that the Company
reassigned work from one employee to another or from one union
to another as a result of a resolution of a jurisdictional dispute by the MTC.

In addition, the Company emphasizes that it

consistently placed the Union on notice that the MTC had no
role regarding work assignments other than the Article V involvement regarding local union representation of employees.
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The MTC Article V Procedure

The Company contends that the procedure used by the MTC
in connection with Article V of the collective bargaining agreement lacks fundamental procedural fairness.

In particular, the

Company argues that the Union failed to conduct hearings, engaged in only limited if any investigations, and did not adhere
to appropriate formalities.

According to the Company, decisions

pertaining to Article V constituted personal decisions of MTC
President DeGregory.

Based upon this evidence, the Company claims

that the Union did not honestly believe that it possessed such
an important role to determine work assignments.

Specifically,

the Company insists that control over work assignments is such
an important management right that: 1) the Company would never
have negotiated a provision that transferred such authority to
the Union; and 2) the Company certainly would not have permitted
the MTC to interfere in such critical determinations pursuant
to contract language that led to such procedural deficiencies.
The Company cites purported determinations of the following
Article V disputes concerning: 1) the handling of transducers
by members of the Boilermakers Union rather than by members of
the Electricians Union and; 2)the cleaning of trucks, machines,
cranes, and tanks by members of the Laborers Union rather than
by members of the Painters Union.

The Company asserts that the

resolution by MTC President DeGregory of these disputes—merely
on the basis of assertions by certain local union officials that
past practice dictated a particular outcome--verifies the procedural deficiencies of the process used by MTC.

The Company

notes that the process used by the Union regarding Article V
improved only after the parties began litigating the meaning of
Article V in federal court.
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The Meaning of Article XL and
Memorandum No. 11

The Company considers Article XL, as supplemented by
Memorandum of Understanding 40, to provide a set of restrictions
and remedies that limits the Company's power concerning work
assignments and prevents misassignments between occupational
titles.

In this regard, the Company admits that the collective

bargaining agreement significantly regulates the Company in this
area and maintains the historical craft jurisdiction of the local
unions.

The Company reads Article XL, first contained in the

1972-1975 Agreement, as preventing misassignments of work involving employees in different occupational titles or in different local unions.

Memorandum of Understanding 40, first contain-

ed in the 1975-1979 Agreement, is viewed by the Company as refining Article XL: 1) by creating a permanent arbitrator—with
special expertise--to hear all work assignment cases; 2) by reiterating the importance of maintaining fundamental craft jurisdiction; 3) by the Company's commitment not to seek interchangeability regarding work assignments; and 4) by recognizing the
Company's responsibility to improve efficiency.

The Company

indicates that additional revisions to the Memorandum appear in
the 1982-1985 Agreement in renumbered Memorandum of Understanding 11.

Thus the Company specifies that a bifurcated arbitration

procedure is used whereby: 1) an initial decision is made to
determine whether a violation occurred and, if so, to issue a
cease and desist order; and 2) monetary damages are available
during the second stage only if the Company violates a cease and
desist order.

On the basis of these detailed provisions, the

Company contends that the Union's interpretation of Article V
would greatly undermine and significantly negate these other
provisions.

Consequently, the Company considers the Union view
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A. The Implementation of Article XL
The Company asserts that Article XL and Memorandum of
Understanding 11 are active parts of the collective bargaining
agreement that have led to a great deal of litigation, large
monetary settlements, and constant use in administering work
assignments.

The Company notes that prior to the inclusion of

Article XL in the 1972-1975 agreement, several arbitration awards
restricted the Company's power over work assignments.

In partic-

ular, the Company calls attention to the Shipman Award (Company
Exhibit 38) as requiring the Company to respect craft competence
and to the Brown Award (Company Exhibit 39) as recognizing that
work assignments could not be made to a craft that lacked the
necessary capability even though the collective bargaining agreement did not explicitly provide for exclusive jurisdiction for
particular crafts.
After the negotiation of Article XL, the Company relies
on several arbitration awards as evidence of the meaning of
Article XL.

Initially, the Company admits that the Santer Award

(Company Exhibit 40) and the Rubin Award (Company Exhibit 41)
upheld the Union's interpretation that Article XL served to
freeze the work assignments that existed from 1968 to 1972 rather
than the Company's view that Article XL merely maintained the
general methodology that developed from 1968 to 1972.
the Company indicates that the Stutz Award

Thereafter

(Company Exhibit 3)

authorized greater flexibility for the Company regarding work
assignments.

Nevertheless, the Company recognizes that the

Altieri Awards (Union Exhibit 21 and Company Exhibit 42) adopted
the approach developed in the Santer Award and the Rubin Award.

-43More recently, the Company indicates that Arbitrator Mittenthal-who the parties designated in 1975 to serve as the permanent
arbitrator for Article XL work assignment disputes--followed the
approach developed by Arbitrators Santer and Rubin as modified
by certain contractual revisions in 1975 and 1982.

The Company

also emphasizes that the parties negotiated two significant
Article XL settlements in January 1977 (Company Exhibit 48) and
October 1981 (Company Exhibit 49).

Accordingly, the Company

insists that Article XL and Memorandum 11 provide the exclusive
contractual framework for resolving work assignment disputes.
B. The Union's Interpretation of Article V
The Company attacks the Union's assertion that Article V
covers work assignment disputes concerning two or more local
unions whereas Article XL applies to work assignment disputes
concerning only one local union.

In this regard, the Company

stresses that such an interpretation would enable the Union to
convert all work assignment disputes into Article V cases by
having a second union assert a claim to the disputed work.

In

addition, the Company argues that the Union interpretation of
Article V lacks consistency and would negate Article XL.
The Company considers the record of grievances that the
Union has filed as support for the Company's view that the Union's
position with respect to the instant grievance lacks merit. Thus,
the Company asserts that the Union randomly cited Article XL,
Appendix A; Article XL and Appendix A; and Article XL and Article
V in processing grievances.

Notwithstanding these actions, the

Company emphasizes that Union witnesses Roger Dawley and Raymond
Sylvia testified that one grievance cannot simultaneously constitute an Article XL and an Article V dispute.

Furthermore,

the Company contends that the Union referred to three grievances
during the instant arbitration in which the Union claimed that
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the Company failed to respect an Article V determination.

The

Company considers these grievances to reflect the inconsistency
and confusion of the Union because two of the grievances alleged
an Article XL violation.

(Compare Union Exhibit 35 and Union

Exhibit 36 with Union Exhibit 37.)

Similarly, the contamination

containment grievance is another example of the Union's improper
merging of Article V and Article XL, according to the Company.
The Company attaches significance to the testimony of MTC President DeGregory that the parties intended Appendix A in the 1968
contract to go along with Article V by providing for proper
union representation of occupational titles.

In contrast to

that testimony, the Company points out that MTC Recording Secretary Messier considered Memorandum 37, which provides for premium pay for contamination containment bag work, as mandating
that such work be assigned to Carpenters.

The Company also

claims that Messier provided inconsistent testimony when he
attempted to differentiate Article XL disputes from Article V
disputes.

The Company underscores Messier's testimony that "a

clear line" does not exist between Article V and Article XL and
deems that testimony as revealing the Union's confusion about
these provisions. (Company Brief at 31-32.)
In addition, the Company describes the Union's interpretation of Article V to be extraordinary and to conflict with
Article XL and Memorandum 11.

By not considering factors other

than past practice (such as historical craft jurisdiction as
reflected in International Union constitutions), the Company
maintains that the Union, in attempting to dispose of work
assignment disputes, fails to process such cases properly.

In

so doing, the Company position is that the Union's revolutionary
approach nullifies the meaning of Article XL and Memorandum 11.

-45-

III. The Union's Processing of the
Contamination Containment Dispute
A. The Zack Award
The Company described the events before the Zack Award as
follows: the Company began using glove bags or "nu-cori bags" in
the early 1960's to curtail exposure to nuclear contaminates.
Health physics monitors (members of the Clerks Union) first
installed the bags; subsequently lead trades also performed such
work with the technical assistance of the health physics monitors
and carpenters began installing the bags in 1965 because of
their low exposure to radiation.

The Company claims that the

Carpenters Union did not possess exclusive rights to install
glove bags.

In support of this view, the Company points to the

Zack Award as sustaining the propriety of a supervisor assigning such work to a machinist and a cleaner rather than to a
carpenter.

The Company concludes that the Zack Award established

that the Carpenters Union failed in attempting to prove exclusivity with respect to bag work.
B. The 1972 Negotiations
The Company analyzes the 1972 negotiations as providing
premium pay to Carpenters without a grant of exclusivity.

The

composition of the Union bargaining committee that negotiated
this provision is not determinative because the Company asserts
that the ultimate contractual provision omitted an express grant
of exclusivity to the Carpenters Union.
C. The Work of the Carpenters and the
Shipyard Test Organization Technicians
The Company contends that STO technicians have installed
simpler secondary containment devices since the 1960's.

It is

the position of the Company that Carpenters installed complex
glove bags. The Company considers characterizing the instant
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dispute as involving the installation of Type IV bags to be misleading because the "Type IV" label has changed over the years:
during the 1960 "s a complex glove bag was called a Type IV bag
whereas a simple plastic wrap with two openings for a pipe-which is not a glove bag--is now called a Type IV bag.

Accord-

ingly, the Company insists that the size, shape and number of
apertures of the devices are critical.
D. The Instant Jurisdictional Dispute
The Company challenges the Union with respect to the instant grievance by claiming that the grievance is an attempt to
gain exclusive work for the Carpenters that the Carpenters failed to secure in the past.

With respect to the procedure follow-

ed by the Union under Article V, the Company maintains that the
original grievance did not refer to a second competing union;
that the Union did not engage in an appropriate investigation;
and that the Union failed to conduct formal hearings.

The Com-

pany concludes that an Article V Jurisdictional dispute does not
exist because Carpenters continue to perform the work that they
had been installing and that such work does not encompass the
work performed by the STO technicians.

The Company recognizes,

however, the possibility that the assignment of contamination
containment work might constitute an Article XL violation.
(Company Reply Brief at 3.).
In its Reply Brief, the Company addressed one additional
point, namely, that the Company denies it had complied with
post-1968 Jurisdictional dispute decisions by the Union except
with respect to one case involving the operation of new equipment
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As I see it, the questions for resolution are:
1.

The meaning of Article V of the collective bargaining agreement;

2.

The meaning of Article XL of the collective bargaining agreement;

3.

Whether the instant dispute is governed
by Article V or Article XL;

4.

The probative relevance of the bargaining history of the governing contract
provisions;

5.

The probative relevance of past practices.

In addition to its substance, the parties negotiated the
title of Article V as JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES.
mentioned throughout that Article.

That phrase is

For purposes of notation,

Article V is repeated below, with that phrase underscored whereever it appears.
ARTICLE V
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES
The Employer and the Metal Trades Council, together with
all the affiliated Local Unions of the Council, agree that in
the event any jurisdictional disputes arise with respect to the
jurisdiction of occupational titles as listed in Appendix A or
any occupational titled added thereto by the Employer such dispute shall be referred to the Metal Trades Council of New London
County for settlement in the following manner:
Upon notice by either the Employer or an affiliated Local
Union involved in a jurisdictional dispute, the Metal Trades
Council will appoint a committee whose responsibility will be
to render an interim decision within seven (7) calendar days of
receipt of said notice. Such decision shall remain in full force
and effect until such time as amended or ratified by the International Union Presidents whose Local Unions are involved in such
dispute.
It is further agreed that pending the adjustment of jurisdictional disputes there shall be no stoppage of work and the
work in dispute shall continue to be performed as assigned by
the Employer. The provisions of this Article shall be absolutely
and equally binding upon the Employer, the Metal Trades Council,
its affiliated Local Unions, and all employes in the bargaining
unit.

-48A jurisdictional dispute is a labor law term of art.

It

is not a term that is unique to the instant parties; it is a
part of the lexicon of labor law.
A reading of Article V, together with its title and frequent reference to jurisdictional disputes and the method for
resolution thereof persuade

me that the parties negotiated

Article V as their method for the voluntary adjustment of jurisdictional disputes within the meaning of Section 10 (JO °f the
National Labor Relations Act.
The record is clear that the parties experienced difficulties during the period that preceded the negotiation of
Article V.

The issue of jurisdiction generated a wildcat strike

in June, 1968 and was an issue in an economic strike which began in July, 1968.

(Compare the testimony of Petchark at trans-

cript 2-20 with the testimony of DeGregory at transcript 2-54,
2-55 and 2-64.)
the

Furthermore, the 1968 negotiations arose after

Charm arbitration award (Company Exhibit 2) which height-

ened the importance of the jurisdiction issue.
With those facts and that conclusion it logically follows
that Article V, if applicable to this dispute, should be interpreted with regard to work assignments and union representation
for that purpose.

Indeed there is no special language or pro-

vision in Article V which would call for a different approach.
The purpose of a dispute settlement alternative to the
machinery of the NLRB is quite clear.

A commentator observed

in l964--during the time frame that preceded the negotiation
of Article V—that:
While it may be difficult to predict the
criteria to be used and relied on by the
Board in a 10(k) case, realistically the
end result is a foregone conclusion--the
employer's assignment will be affirmed.
This has been the result in all but five
of the fifty-five cases in which awards
have been made by the Board since CBS.

-49M. F. O'Donoghue, Jurisdictional Disputes in the Construction
Industry Since CBS, 52 GEO. L.J. 321-22 (1964) (footnotes omitted
This conclusion is confirmed by a more recent article that
examined the Jurisdictional dispute decisions of the Board during the 1960's--the period that provided the setting for the
negotiation of Article V.

The author indicated that:

While the Board's opinion awarding the
work will be cast in terms of work area
practices, skills, efficiency and the
like, as a practical matter we can be
reasonably sure that the Board will issue
its award to the union preferred by the
employer . . . . From 1961 through the
end of 1970 the Board made 349 section 10
(k) awards and confirmed the employer's
preference in 95.1 percent of the cases;
96.5 percent of the awards involving the
construction industry confirmed the employer's preference.
D. Leslie, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in Resolving
Union Jurisdictional Disputes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1470, 1472
(1975) (footnote omitted); see also L. J.Cohen, The NLRB and
Section 10 (k):

A Study of the Reluctant Dragon, 14 LAB. L.J.

905, 910-12 (1963).

Thus it is understandable that the MTC would

have sought Article V so that the Union would have an opportunity to influence craft jurisdiction and to avoid the section 10
(k) presumption in favor of the employer's work assignment.
This is even more understandable in terms of the Union's mindset after the Charm Award.
Also the fact is and was that the use of the NLRB as a
mechanism for resolving Jurisdictional disputes is unsatisfactory
due to the delay involved.

For example, Professor Dunlop noted

that, "a fair sized dam can be built faster than a typical order
of the N.L.R.B."

J.T. Dunlop, Jurisdictional Disputes, PROCEED-

INGS OF N.Y.U. SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 477, 500 (1949).
This problem is especially acute when the time pressure and
integration of the work of different crafts are association with
the construction of nuclear submarines.

The instant dispute is essentially a disagreement over
"work jurisdiction" and "union representation."

The Company
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claims it may assign any employee to the work, according the
unions the right to require said employee to join the proper
union.

The Union on the other hand, claims that the initial

work assignment by the Company must be to employees already
represented by the union with that work jurisdiction.
Years ago, the NLRB distinguished representation proceedings from jurisdictional

awards:

a Board certification in a representation
proceeding is not a jurisdictional award;
it is merely a determination that a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit
have selected a particular labor organization as their representative for purposes
of collective bargaining . . . . However,
unlike a jurisdictional award, this determination by the Board does not freeze the
duties or work tasks of the unit found
appropriate.
Plumbing Contractors Association,
(emphasis added); see generally
The Role of the National

95 N.L.R.B. 1081 (1951)
G. Farmer & N. Thompson Powers,

Labor Relations Board in Resolving

Jurisdictional Disputes, 46 VA. L. Rev. 660, 697-706 (1960).
The phrase "jurisdictional dispute" is a frequently used
and heavily litigated concept in labor law.

The Taft-Hartley

Act amended the National Labor Relations Act in 1947 by adding
Section 8(b)(4)(D) provides:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization or its agents-(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his
employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or
(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either
case an object thereof is-(D) forcing or requiring any employer to
assign particular work to employees in a
particular labor organization or in a
particular trade, craft, or class rather
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than to employees in another labor
organization or in another trade, craft,
or class,unless such employer is failing
to conform to an order or certification
of the Board determining the bargaining
representative for employees performing
such work:
The Taft-Hartley amendments also added Section 10(k) to
the National Labor Relations Act to provide a mechanism for the
Board to resolve the merits of jurisdictional disputes.

Section

10(k) provides:
Whenever it is charged that any person has
engaged in an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of paragraph (4)(D) of section
8(b), the Board is empowered and directed
to hear and determine the dispute out of
which such unfair labor practice shall have
arisen, unless, within ten days after notice
that such charge has been filed, the parties
to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or
agreed upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by
the parties to thedispute with the decision
of the Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be
dismissed.
The United States Supreme Court considered these provisions
in the landmark case of NLRB v. Broadcast Engineers Local 1212
(Columbia Broadcasting System), 364 U.S. 573 (1961).

The Court

reasoned that:
Section 10(k) . . . quite plainly emphasizes
belief of Congress that it is more important
to industrial peace that jurisdictional disputes be settled permanently than it is that
unfair labor practice sanctions for jurisdictional strikes be imposed upon unions.
Accordingly, § 10(k) offers strong inducements
to quarreling unions to settle their differences by directing dismissal of unfair labor
practice charges upon voluntary adjustment of
jurisdictional disputes.
Id. at 576-77.

The Court articulated its understanding of the

"jurisdictional dispute" concept by indicating that it refers
to "a dispute between two or more groups of employees over which
is entitled to do

certain work for an employer."

Id. at 579

(emphasis added).

In addition to this language, which involves

the work assignment decision and not merely the question con-

-52cerning representation, the Court discerned that:
This language also indicates a congressional
purpose to have the Board do something more
than merely look at prior board orders and
certifications or a collective bargaining
contract to determine whether one or the
other union has a clearly defined statutory
or contractual right to have the employees
it represents perform certain work tasks.
For, in the vast majority of cases, such a
narrow determination would leave the broader
problem of work assignments in the hands of
the employer, exactly where it was before
the enactment of § 10(k)--with the same old
basic jurisdictional dispute likely continuing to vex him, and the rival unions, short
of striking, would still be free to adopt
other forms of pressure upon the employer.
The § 10(k) hearing would therefore accomplish little but a restoration of the preexisting situation, a situation already
found intolerable by Congress and by all
parties concerned. If this newly granted
Board power to hear and determine jurisdictional disputes had meant no more than
that, Congress certainly would have achieved
very little to solve the knotty problem of
wasteful work stoppages due to such disputes.
Id. at 579-80 (footnotes omitted).

Thus the statutory mechan-

ism for resolving jurisdcitional disputes involved a shift of
the authority to assign work away from the employer.

Congress

deemed this transfer to be necessary to avoid the troublesome
problem of work stoppages that arose from jurisdictional dis•
putes. Congress concluded that avoiding such work stoppages
outweighed management's interest in retaining exclusive control
over work assignments.
The meaning of a jurisdictional dispute is evident when
the limitations of a section 10(k) proceeding are considered
from a representation perspective:
representational. . . claims are normally
handled by ascertaining the desire of particular employees to be represented by one
or more rival unions. The section 10(k)
hearing which would come into place if such
. . . claims were considered jurisdictional disputes is neither designed for, nor
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capable of, accommodating the wishes
of employees concerning their own representation status.1
D. Leslie, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in Resolving
Jurisdictional Disputes, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1470, 1488 (1975).
Thus, Jurisdictional disputes involve issues pertaining
to the assignment of work, and differ from representational
disputes.

One commentator observed:
Jurisdictional disputes can be distinguished from representational disputes
because in the former, two or more unions
seek the right to do specific work for their
members, not to change the union affiliation
of the other claimants of the work. The
membership and representation rights of the
unions are not affected; the conflict is over
the right to do certain work and not to represent certain employees.

J.B. Atleson, The NLRB and Jurisdictional Disputes:

The after-

math of CBS, 53 GEO L.J. 93, 140 (1960); (emphasis added).

see

also G. Farmer & N. Thompson Powers, The Role of the National
Labor Relations Board in Resolving Jurisdictional Disputes,
46 VA. L. REV. 660, 664 (1960).
In addition, a definitive treatise on labor law echoes
this distinction in the context of a particular Board case:
It is sometimes difficult to draw a distinction between work assignment disputes and controversies over which of two unions should
represent the particular employees who are
performing the work. The distinction between
Section 9 representational disputes is not
always sharply defined. The Board acknowledged
the difficulty in the Detroit News case but
concluded from the facts that a work assignment
dispute existed since the union claimed the
right to the dispute work itself, rather than
any right to represent employees performing it.
1. This reasoning is especially applicable to the non-suitability of Article V to resolve questions concerning
representation.
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THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1274 (C. Morris ed. 2d. ed. 1983)
(emphasis in original).
Similarly, another commentator indicated:
Literally construed, the language of
section 8(b)(4)(D) covers every dispute over the representation of employees. In practice, however, there
has arisen a firm distinction between
representational and jurisdictional
matters. There is general agreement
now that a representation case is raised
when two unions seek to represent the
same employees but neither union demands
that the employees be replaced if it
prevails. A jurisdictional dispute, on
the other hand, is presented when each
union seeks to place its own members in
the performance of certain work.
D. Leslie, The Role of the NLRB and the Courts in Resolving
Union Jurisdictional Disputes, 75 COLUM L. REV. 1470, 1487
(1975) (footnote omitted)(emphasis added).
Various commentators have echoed this reasoning.

One

author observed:
All jurisdictional strikes and threats are
not covered by section 8(b)(4)(D), but only
those where an object is to force an assignment of work to one group of employees rather
than to another.
J.B. Atleson, The NLRB and Jurisdictional Disputes;

The After-

math of CBS, 53 GEO. L.J. 93, 108 (1964) (emphasis added).

Consider the following quotation and its factual relevance
to the instant dispute.

Consider also its applicability to the

instant circumstances where more than one union - indeed ten represent the employees:
Despite charters and constitutional expressions of jurisdiction, and although there is
little difficulty with the core of a union's
jurisdiction, the outer boundaries of a union
are unclear. In addition, though no craft
can be completely substituted for another,
often, on the fringe of a craft's expertise,
the skills of one union can be substituted
for the skills of another.
It is impossible to describe work tasks in
exhaustive detail. Furthermore, modifications
in material, tools and techniques render existing definitions of jurisdiction obsolete and
inadequate.
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J.B. Atleson, The NLRB and Jurisdictional Disputes:

The After-

math of CBS, 53 GEO. L.J. 93, 97 (1964) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
The observation

of Professor John T. Dunlop, a leading

labor relations authority and former Secretary of Labor is
pertinent.

In Jurisdictional Disputes, 1949 Proceedings of

the N.Y.U. Conference on Labor 477-504, he identified three
types of disputes: factionalism within a single labor organization; a rivalty between and among unions; and work assignment disputes in which "the contending organizations are not
seeking new members; they are demanding the work in dispute for
existing members.

Id. at 479 (emphasis added).

After recogniz-

ing the difficulty in distinguishing a rivalry and a work
assignment dispute, Professor Dunlop observed:
To seek to settle Jurisdictional disputes
in terms of representation is tantamount
to providing either that the employer shall
receive the sanction of law for any assignment he makes or that possession of the work
carries with it the right to the work. There
could be no more fertile ways to stimulate
Jurisdictional disputes.
. . . [J]urisdiction is a different problem
from representation.
Id. at 480-81.
In its simplest terms, a Jurisdictional dispute requires
that two or more employee groups must actively seek the disputed work.

See, e.g., Local 107, Highway Truckdrivers

Safeway Stores, Inc.), 134 N.L.R.B. 1320 (1961); see also J.B.
Atleson, The NLRB and Jurisdictional Disputes; the Aftermath
of CBS, 53 GEO. L.J. 93, 101-09 (1964); THE DEVELOPING LABOR
LAW 1254 (C. Morris ed. 2d ed. 1983).
My conclusion that Article V deals with the type of Jurisdictional disputes that would fall within section 10(k) of the
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Act, notwithstanding, the critical question is whether the
instant dispute is of that nature or instead a "work assignment" dispute exclusively under and within the meaning of Article
XL of the contract under which the Union did not grieve.
I have reviewed all the arbitration awards submitted by
the parties in the record bearing on the history, interpretation and application of Article XL.

A recitation of the pert-

inent holdings and reasons of those decisions is material as
follows.
Predating the negotiation of Article XL are the awards
of arbitrators Zack, Charm, Shipman and Brown.
Arbitrator Arnold Zack rendered an award, dated June 21,
1966 (Joint Exhibit 6), which found that "the Company's assignment of Carpenters to do NuCon bagging in the period from early
1965 until the time of the grievance" did not constitute "a
recognition of their exclusive jurisdiction over this work."
Id. at 4-5.

In discussing the concept of exclusive juris-

diction, the Arbitrator observed that:
There is no question that certain tasks
have come to be viewed as within the
sphere of performance of specific skilled
trades to the exclusion of other skilled
trades. This is particularly true where
the tasks to be performed or the materials
upon which the work is to be done have
traditionally been associated with the
particular trade. It has even come to be
true in recent years that such traditional
jurisdiction may be expanded to include the
performance of new tasks which may come to
be associated with the traditional means or
materials of operation.
But thisdoes not necessarily mean that whenever a task is assigned to a certain skilled
group that that task automatically and perpetually comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of that craft.
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Arbitrator Sumner D. Charm rendered an award, dated April
27, 1967, concerning the application of seniority for layoff
purposes pursuant to the 1965 collective bargaining agreement.
(Company Exhibit 2).

The dispute narrowed to whether an em-

ployee's length of service within one department would be
"applied on a department-wide basis, or only within an occupational subdivision within the department."
2 at 3).

(Company Exhibit

The Arbitrator denied the grievance by sustaining

the Company's interpretation that "accumulated seniority does
not apply (in layoffs) beyond his own occupational subdivision."
Arbitrator Shipman rendered an arbitration award in 1967
concerning a claim by the Carpenters that a Machinist

improperly

performed uncrating work that Carpenters normally had performed.
(Company Exhibit 38).

The Company rejected the grievance be-

cause an emergency had existed on a Saturday, which was not a
normal work day, and the disputed work lasted for five or ten
minutes and was incidental to the primary work being performed
at the time.

It is noteworthy that Arbitrator Shipman perceived

in 1967 that: "It is evident that this dispute is symptomatic
of a basic underlying work jurisdiction problem, a problem
accentuated of late by a growing number of complaints and grievances on this question." Id. at 7.

Arbitrator Shipman analyzed

the dispute as follows:
Thus, the Arbitrator must conclude that
the Agreement, considered in the light of
the practice thereunder in which the Machine
Shop and the Company's admitted policy to
reserve uncrating work in the Machine Shop,
where practicable, to Carpenters establishes
that all Machine Shop uncrating work falls
within the work jurisdiction of the Carpenters.
Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). The Arbitrator also declared that:
"It is obvious that work jurisdiction cannot be established unilaterally by unions." Id. at 19.

Although the Arbitrator found
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this conclusion to be "obvious," there is no discussion to
explain the basis for that conclusion.

After concluding, in

essence, that a "reasonable" standard should be used to balance
the Company's operational needs with the Union's concern for
preserving craft integrity, Arbitrator Shipman found that no
contractual violation had occurred under the particular circumstances .
Arbitrator Leo C. Brown rendered an arbitration award,
dated February 20, 1968, concerning a dispute about the assignment of sound dampening work to the Carpenters instead of to the
Sheetmetal Workers (represented by the Boilermakers).
Exhibit 39).

(Company

After finding that the collective bargaining

agreement did not provide for exclusive jurisdiction either
explicitly or implicitly, the Arbitrator commented upon the
effect of the existence of different trades and crafts as
follows:
Recognition of particular trades and crafts
implies a recognition of different skills;
it does not, however, imply any limitation
upon the Company's right to judge that a
particular craft is capable of performing a
specific type of work and of assigning that
work to that craft. . .
The Company's recognition of the existence
of different crafts implies a recognition
of a distinction in skills. This recognition implies a limitation with respect to
work assignments only when the assignment
is so wholly improper that it falls outside
of the reasonable capabilities of the craft
to which the assignment is made; that is,
when an assignment is made not on the basis
of sound business judgment or normal utilization of skills, but for some improper
purpose. Examples would be assignments made
in order to discriminate against and to undermine a particular craft or to escape some
burdensome contractual commitment such as the
payment of a lower wage to the craft used than
the higher wage that would have to be paid to
the craft that normally would have been used.
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Id. at 19.

The Arbitrator ultimately found, in essence, that

joint jurisdiction had existed for the disputed work and,
therefore, sustained the decision of the Company to assign the
work to the Carpenters.
Article XL was then agreed to as part of the 1972-1975
contract (subsequently modified by Memorandum of Understanding
40 in the 1975-1979 contract and renumbered as Memorandum of
Understanding 11 in the 1979-1982 contract and retained as
Memorandum of Understanding 11 in the 1982-1985 contract.)
Thereafter, Arbitrator Mark Santer rendered an award,
dated August 22, 1974, in which he found that the Company had
violated Article XL and Appendix A of the collective bargaining agreement by assigning certain wire checking and documentation work to STO Test-Electrical organization personnel rather
than to Inspector-Electrical Nuclear Quality Control from
November 30, 1973 to May 1974.

(Company Exhibit 40.)

The

gravamen of the case concerned the meaning of the first sentence
of Article XL and the first sentence of Appendix A.

They read:

Article XL
Current practices in regard to work assignments and operations that have been in effect
under the 1968-1972 agreement shall remain in
effect.
Appendix A—Occupational Titles
Work performed under occupational titles listed in Appendix A is recognized and established
as within the jurisdiction of the craft under
which they are listed.
(Company Exhibit 40 at 4) .
Santer interpreted this language in the context of the
pending grievance:
If a (current) work assignment practice was
in effect during the 1968-1972 Agreement it
is to remain. It is not a statement referring to a particular work practice of inspection. It is a general type of inspection.
It is a general type of statement. . . . [T]he
language is much broader. It is general
almost universal. The conclusion is that the
practice was for Inspectors to do the work
given the Testers during this experiment.
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albeit in
general form
mandates that the job elements that inspectors formerly performed
that were to continue to be done by bargaining unit personnel belong to inspectors. To come to any other conclusion
would mean the parties would have to delineate all the elements of every single
job assignment for each classification.
To prevent mind-boggling and a loose-leaf
booklet weighing several pounds, the expression 'current practices. . .shall remain in effect' was written. Otherwise,
that language is without purpose.
Id. at 8-9.

He, therefore, sustained the grievance.

Arbitrator Milton Rubin rendered an arbitration award in
October 1974 which found that the Company had violated Appendix
A and Article XL of the collective bargaining agreement by
assigning to Machinists certain work that the Pipefitter trade
had regularly performed.

(Company Exhibit 41.)

Arbitrator

Rubin expressly adopted the reasoning of the Santer Opinion and
Award dated August 22, 1974.

As a result, Arbitrator Rubin

concluded that, "the grieved work has been regularly assigned
to pipefitters classified in the trades for that work in Appendix
A."

Id. at 11.
Arbitrator Robert L. Stutz rendered an award, dated June

21, 1977, that considered a claim by the Union that the Company
had violated Appendix A and Article XL of the 1972-1975 collective bargaining agreement by misassigning certain wiring work.
(Company Exhibit 3.)

The Company reassigned the work from the

Electronics Mechanics classification to the Outside Electricians
classification.

IBEW Local 261 represented both classifications.

The employees possessed the same skills, received the same wages,
and performed the same type of work.

The Arbitrator reviewed

the Shipman Award, the Brown Award, the Santer Award, and the
Rubin Award.

In analyzing the meaning of Appendix A and Article

XL, Arbitrator Stutz observed:
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When all of the evidence in this record relating to the practice of work assignments
during the 1968-72 period is viewed from
this distant, objective perspective, it is
revealed that the Company did retain and
exercise some flexibility in making work
assignments. That flexibility was not unlimited; it was utilized in pursuit of
efficient operation of the shipyard and
the effective use of personnel. It was
constrained by an awareness of an historical respect for craft lines and occupational jurisdictions. It appears to have been
exercised, whether consciously or unconsciously, in accordance with the guidelines laid
down in the Shipman and Brown decisions.
Company Exhibit 3 at 12.

The Arbitrator focused on the language

contained in the first sentence of Article XL and found that:
This language seems clearly to have been
designed to preserve the general overall
practices in regard to work assignments
and operations, not to bind the Company
to specific work assignments and methods
of operation that existed during the 196872 Agreement.
Company Exhibit 3 at 13.

Following this assessment, Arbitrator

Stutz commented on the Santer and Rubin awards:
It is not necessary for this arbitrator to
make any finding with respect to the conclusions reached by Santer and Rubin. Those
conclusions were reached on an entirely different record and may very well be the ones
that any competent arbitrator would have
reached on that record.
Company Exhibit 3 at 14.
Arbitrator Stutz then sustained the Company's decision by
denying the grievance because the outside Electricians possessed the necessary skill and that the Company did not have an improper purpose.
Arbitrator Richard Mittenthal rendered an award, dated
September 18, 1978, concerning the interpretation and application of Memorandum of Understanding 40 of the November 26, 1975
collective bargaining agreement.

Mittenthal reviewed the

Shipman Award, the Broawn Award, the bargaining history of
Article XL, the Santer Award, the Rubin Award, the bargaining
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In analyzing the grievance before him, Mittenthal perceived his
role as follows:
It seems clear that my function here is
to interpret and apply the Memorandum.
The parties have not reargued Article XL.
They wrote the Memorandum in the belief
that the meaning of XL had evidently been
settled by the Santer-Rubin awards. I
feel I should approach the Memorandum from
the same vantage point. I recognize, however, that the Stutz award takes a different
view of XL.
Company Exhibit 43 at 10.

He characterized the competing inter-

ests of the parties by stating that the "struggle was between
Management's need for flexibility and the Union's committment
to stability."

(Id., emphasis in original).

He also recognized

that the Memorandum of Understanding:
indicates that the parties reach a compromise on the work assignment question. The
Company did not obtain the kind of unfettered flexibility it originally appears to have
sought; the Union did not obtain the kind of
rigid stability it originally attempted to
guarantee. Both parties were forced to accept something less than they desired.
Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).

Arbitrator Mittenthal thus

interpreted Memorandum of Understanding 40 as having added a
proviso to Article XL whereby:
the "restrictions" imposed by work assignment practices under XL can sometimes be
avoided by Management exercising its newly established 'assignment' right under the
Memorandum. What this means is that an employee who experiences "unreasonable delay"
in completing his work can be given an
"assignment" to some other work ordinarily
done by another occupation "in order to reduce [his] idle time.
Id. at 11 (bracketed phrase in original).

Furthermore,

Mittenthal stressed that the Company had promised, "to honor
'fundamental craft jurisdictions' or, concersely not to insist
on 'interchangeability.'"
Id. With respect to the meaning of the term, "fundamental craft
jurisdiction," Mittenthal stated:
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The parties have not defined the phrase
"fundamental craft jurisdiction." It seems
to me that they must have been referring to
the central skills which account for the existence of the craft, the core duties which
impart to the craft its essential integrity.
One could read the phrase "fundamental
craft jurisdiction" broadly to encompass all
duties customarily performed by a craft.
That would include not only central skills
but lesser tasks as well. . . . That could
hardly have been what the parties intended.
Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).
Arbitrator Mittenthal subsequently rendered a number of
awards arising pursuant to Article XL:
1.

Company Exhibit 44 is an award dated August 11, 1980

denying a grievance under the 1975 agreement concerning certain
inspection work that the Company had assigned to Pipefitters
rather than to Piping Inspectors.

Plumbers and Pipefitters

Local 620 represented the Pipefitters and the Piping Inspectors.
The Arbitrator found that:
The Pipefitter, however, does not inspect
anyone else's work. He examines only his
own material, his own work product. He
makes that examination not as an Inspector but rather as an employee who is expected to do his job correctly. . . . This
kind of "inspection," it seems to me, is
an integral part of the typical craft occupation.
Id. at 8.

With respect to the limited transfer of certain

clerical duties to the Pipefitters, the Arbitrator concluded
that, "the clerical functions involved in this reassignment. . .
cannot be considered part of the 'central skills' or 'core
duties' of the Inspector craft."
2.

(Id. at 10) .

Company Exhibit 45 involved a consent award dated

April 28, 1982 pursuant to the 1982-1985 agreement that involved occupational titles represented by the same union.

The

Award directed that the Company cease and desist from the practice that the union grieved but expressly preserved the substantive arguments of each party.
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Company Exhibit 46 involved an award dated June 16,

1983 that concerned a grievance by Laborers Local 364 that
challenged the Company's assignment of certain clean-up work
to the Pipefitters.

The Arbitrator determined the practices

that had existed during the critical benchmark period from
1968 to 1972.
XL.

In so doing he confined his analysis to Article

It is significant that the determination that the Pipe-

fitters had performed certain clean-up work (albeit not all
of the clean-up work that the Laborers grieved) meant that the
Arbitrator did not view such work under Article XL as involving the exclusive work of the Laborers.

Instead, the custom-

ary practice of the Pipefitters performing limited clean-up
work suggests that such work constituted lesser tasks of the
Pipefitters.

In contrast, the Arbitrator's finding that the

Pipefitters performed certain clean-up work that they had not
customarily performed during the 1968-1972 interval required
an award sustaining that portion of the grievance of the
Laborers.

In essence, such work by the Pipefitters did not

even constitute a contractually recognizable lesser task under
Article XL because the Pipefitters had not performed it from
1968 to 1972.

The Arbitrator expressly found Memorandum of

Understanding 11 (previously Memorandum of Understanding 40)
to be inapplicable because the Company failed to assert it.
4.

Company Exhibit 47 involved a claim by the Painters

that the Pipefitters had improperly performed certain paint
removal work.

The Award, dated August 31, 1983, found that

"paint removal was not assigned exclusively to Painters between
1968 and 1972.

Hence, there is no work assigned practice in

this case which is protected by Article XL."

(Id. at 4.)

Al-

though the Arbitrator did not find that the Company had assigned
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Arbitrator did find that it had assigned Grinders, who were
members of the Boilermakers, to do so.

The Arbitrator also

found that the Pipefitters had performed such work on their
own initiative from 1968 to 1972.

The Arbitrator viewed such

work as a contractually protected lesser task of the Pipefitters.
In addition, the Arbitrator found it to be unnecessary to consider Memorandum 11, formerly Memorandum 40.
Arbitrator James V. Altieri rendered an award, dated
February 1, 1980, concerning the propriety of an alleged misassignment of work to a different occupational title.
Exhibit 21.)

(Union

The Arbitrator commented, "the instant arbitration

is the fourth in line calling for the expression of an opinion
on the proper interpretation and application of Article XL, as
it was found in the 1972-75 agreement."
16-17.)

(Union Exhibit 21 at

Arbitrator Altieri reviewed at length and in substan-

tial detail the background of the relevant provisions of the
collective bargaining agreements and delineated the conflict
between the Santer and Rubin Awards as compated to the Stutz
Award.

In addition, Altieri referred to proceedings before

Arbitrator Mittenthal, the permanent umpire pursuant to
Memorandum of Understanding 40, in which Mittenthal addressed
the Memorandum and Article XL of the collective bargaining
agreement and had proceeded "on the assumption that the SanterRubin award was correct."

(Union Exhibit 21 at 18.)

Arbitra-

tor Altieri then discussed the existence of conflicting arbitration awards:
I am aware the parties have decided to make
this case the "lead 1 or 'pilot1 case for
the grievances which still remain unsettled
under the 1972-75 agreement. But the problem with the approach of permitting recourse

-67to other arbitrators when one is unhappy
with the results achieved to that point,
remains the same. What I believe should
be the controlling norm is that when the
self-same issues first arises between the
same parties and with respect to the same
contract, that decision, unless it is
clearly erroneous, should be final and
binding not only with respect to the specific incident that precipitated the grievance, but all like incidents in grievances
that may be filed thereafter raising the
same issue. J_d. at 19) .
Accordingly, Altieri followed the Santer approach by sustaining the grievance on the basis that the:
Company violated Article XL when it assigned the inspection work that had been performed exclusively by structural quality control
inspectors during the period 1968-72 to chippers, who are in a separate and different
occupational title.
Union Exhibit 21 at 32.

See also Company Exhibit 42 at 4

(Arbitrator Altieri discussing his prior Award).
In the subsequent award, dated December 1, 1980 (Company
Exhibit 42), Arbitrator Altieri again reviewed Article XL and
Appendix A of the 1972-1975 collective bargaining

agreement.

He indicated that:
the long history of controversy over this
contractual provision was not destined to
come to an early end. The Company was willing to abide by the agreement making Case
#B-328-4 the pilot or lead case and therefore accepted the ruling therein that the
manner in which an assignment had been made
during the 1968-1972 period would dictate
the Company's obligations in the 1972-1975
period.
Company Exhibit 42 at 4-5.

The parties, however, failed to

agree on an appropriate remedy for such violations.

Arbitrator

Altieri found that this prior award "is binding not only as to
the merits of the grievance, but as to the appropriate remedy
. . . . " (Company Exhibit 42 at 6-7.)
undisturbed.

He left his prior remedy

-68It appears that the instant grievance #C-14-82 and this
arbitration case before me is the first case requiring consideration of both Article V and Article XL.

That inter-provision-

al question did not come up in any of the foregoing cited arbitration cases because they were sounded as alleged Article XL
violations or predated the negotiation of Article XL.

The

matter is further complicated by the fact that the instant
arbitration case appears to be the first in which an Article
V violation is alleged.

The latter is explained, of course by

the presence in the contract of Article VI Section 9 which
states:
It is further agreed that Jurisdictional
disputes are not a subject for the grievance and arbitration procedures as defined in this Article but will be settled in
accordance with the procedures as set forth
in Article V Jurisdictional Disputes.
Indeed this case is before me because of the Court's ruling
referring the dispute to arbitration.
The answer to whether the instant dispute is covered by
Article V or Article XL cannot be found within the Article XL
arbitration decisions.

Those decisions, based on Article XL

claims and confined to Article XL make no mention of nor have
any enlightening bearing on the applicability of Article V.

I

have recited the relevant parts of those discussions in some
detail for the purpose of making that limited parameter clear.
A well settled concept of contract law is that different
contract sections should be reconciled and harmonized, and that
neither should oust or nullify the other.

Article V and Article

XL are independent and integral parts of the same contract.

I

am certain the parties negotiated both for separate purposes and
each has a separate effectiveness.
I have carefully considered the testimony regarding the
negotiations of those Articles and the practices thereunder.
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pre-empt the other.

intended to

More importantly, the testimony on the

bargaining history or practice do not reveal whether the instant type of dispute is covered by or should be grieved under
Article V or Article XL.

The considered evidence on these

points in the record is simply inconclusive.

Documents and

witnesses were not available and memories were not sufficiently
precise to meet the standard of proof required.
By example, compare the following testimony of Petchark
and DeGregory.

Regarding the intent of the parties regarding

Article V Petchark said:
Q:

Now, during the discussions on Article
V in 1968, do you claim that any member
of the Company told anybody of the Union
that what they had in mind was that Article V should be used to determine which
Union would represent the people who were
doing work assigned by the Company?

A:

Yes.

Q:

Who made that statement, sir?

A:

Principally three people.
and Charles Oles.

Wilkens, Stone

Transcript at 2-21 through 2-23.
DeGregory testified:

1.

Q:

Did you ever hear anyone from the Company in 1968 state those interpretations
that either Mr. Petchark or Mr. Kelleher
have stated in these proceedings?

A:

No.

Q:

Now, did anyone give that interpretation
of Article V during the 1968 negotiations?

A:

Absolutely not.

Q:

Did Mr. Petchark ever state that as his

None of these testified
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interpretation of the 1968 negotiations?
A:

No, he didn't.

Q:

Did he ever tell you after you concluded
the contract at the end of '68 that that
was his interpretation?

A:

No.

Q:

Did he ever tell you in 1968 or 1970 or
until the time he left the Metal Trades
Council and went with the Company that
that was his understanding of the interpretation?

A:

No, he didn't.

•

•

•

Transcript at 2-92 through 2-93.
The inconclusiveness represented by this testimony runs
through the entire record.

There is nothing before me which

would persuade me to accord greater credit to either testimony
or to the other offsetting evidence.
Therefore, neither the record nor the contract provides
the answer as to which contract Article applies to the dispute at hand.

As both sections are entitled to recognition and

effectiveness, it would mean that either or both Articles are
applicable or may be utilized if the facts and substance of the
dispute fit within their meaning.

Do the facts and substance

of the grievance meet the provisions and coverage of these
Articles?

I answer in the affirmative.

I have held that the title and language of Article V are
traditional.

I have found that Article V is and was intended

to be the voluntary adjustment procedure contemplated by Section
10(k) of the Act.

References to the cases and quotations cited

and underscored earlier, show that Article V, as would be the
case under 10(k), covers claims for work jurisdiction and for
assignment by the employer of the disputed work
represented by a particular union.

to employees

The Company's theory of

Article V, namely that it was negotiated to give the unions
membership authority over whomever the Company assigned to do
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NLRB and the United States Supreme Court, at variance from the
textual writings and observations of authorities in the field,
and most importantly unsupported by any special contract language.
I again call attention to the line of Board and court cases cited
earlier in which the term "jurisdictional dispute" was consistently defined as:
"a dispute between two or more groups of
employees, over which is entitled to do
certain work for an employer;" (emphasis added_
where "two or more unions seek the right
to do specific work for their members;"
(emphasis added)
"the conflict over the right to do certain
work and not to represent certain employees;"
(emphasis added)
"where each union seeks to place its own
members in the performance of certain work"
(emphasis added)
The Union's claim in the instant case and the facts of the dispute
square with the foregoing definitions. It is equally apparent that
the Company's theory of the case, and the positions it advances
are different from these well settled definitions.

Having failed

to prove any unusual interpretation by bargaining history or practice, I cannot insert any such special arrangement into the collective bargaining relationship or into the ordinary contract languag^.
Nor can I find evidence that active claims by the Machinists Union
and the Carpenters Union were pretextual or frivolous.

Hence I

find that the dispute at hand falls within the terms of Article V.
By the same token, and again based on a record before me that
fails to make any significant delineations between the two, I find
that the dispute also falls within the terms of Article XL.

A

review of the Article XL arbitration decisions discloses facts
and disagreements similar to the facts and disagreement of the
instant grievance.

I find nothing in the record which would have

-72foreclosed the Union from initiating a grievance under Article XL
when the Company assigned the "con-con" bag work to employees,
who at the time of the assignment, were not represented by the
Carpenters Union.
ly set

The contract and the record before me certain-

up different procedures for Article V and Article XL

claims and disputes, but neither the contract nor this record
has provided me with any probative information on which was intended to prevail in this case or why.

In short, depending on

how sounded and cast, the instant dispute is both a jurisdictional dispute under Article V and a work assignment dispute under
Article XL.
The parties are responsible for having negotiated both
Articles.

The parties are responsible for failing to make any

essential distinctions between them in the instant case.

And it

is therefore for the parties in direct negotiations and not in
arbitration, to make distinctions for subsequent matters.
In short, the Union has proved that the facts and substance
of the instant dispute are as much covered by Article V as the
Company has proved that they may fall within Article XL.
That being so, I cannot find that the Union did not have the
contractual right to claim the work and the employee assignment
under Article V when the Company did not accord the work and make
the assignment that way.
The considerable number of exhibits on previous work assignments decided by the MTC; the Company's agreement, acquiescence
or opposition to those decisions, and unilateral actions by
the Company in making work assignments are also conflicting and
indeterminative.

Also, because those situations involve the

merits of the assignment, they are immaterial in view of my
finding that Article V is applicable.
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With my holding that this is an Article V matter, the
Article V Committee

decision of the MTC is incontestable

under the grievance or arbitration provisions of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 30, 1985

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers Union,
Local 5
and

A W A R D

Case No. 2 3 4 9 A

General Dynamics Corporation
Quincy Shipbuilding Division

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
Grievance 2349A dated November 6, 1984 protesting the discharge of Mario Berdet is
arbitrable.
The evidence does not clearly and convincingly establish that the probationary period of Mr. Berdet was extended by the "mutual agreement" required by Section 4(a) of
Article VIII of the contract. The critical
oral testimony on the point was offsetting
and inconclusive, and falls short of the requisite proof.
This is not to say that the Company representative did not believe that an agreement
had been reached with his Union counterpart,
but rather that the latter1s belief and testimony that no such agreement was finalized, are
equally plausible and believable.
Though the contract does not require that mutually agreed to extensions of the probationary period be in writing, I am surprised that
in a circumstance of this importance, where
employee rights are significantly different
during and after the probationary period, and
where the unilateral and unchallengeable right
of the Company to terminate during the probationary period are involved, the instant situation
was not confirmed or recorded by some form of
written mutual agreement or jointly signed memorandum.
That it was not, together with the inconclusiveness of the testimony of those involved in the
relevant discussions, cast evidentiary doubt on
the existence of an enforceable mutual agreement.
Therefore, the Company has not shown that Mr.
Berdet was still a probationary employee when
he was terminated. Absent that showing,
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Mr. Berdet is accorded the contract rights
of an employee with seniority. Hence the
propriety of his discharge is subject to
the grievance and arbitration provisions
of the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 9, 1985
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss':
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon rny Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and
who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Industrial Union of Marine and
Shipbuilding Workers Union,
Local 5

OPINION AND AWARD
Case No. 2321A
2365A

and
General Dynamics Corporation
Quincy Shipbuilding Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was the termination of Panfilo Paolilli for
Just cause? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Braintree, Massachusetts on June 4,
1984 at which time Mr. Paolilli, hereinafter referred to as the
grievant, and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

record was taken.

A stenographic

The Union summarized its case verbally; the

Company filed a post-hearing brief.
I deem the Company's version of what happened, and its evidence in support thereof, to be accurate.

Accordingly, I conclude

that without provocation the grievant was insubordinate, abusive,
disrespectful and physically threatening to his supervisor.
I am not persuaded that the grievant's difficulty with the
English language created a

misunderstanding about what he was

instructed to do by his supervisor or was a basis for the grievant ' s conduct.
The testimony of a Union witness in the grievant's defense
was not sufficiently probative.

That witness did not see the full

transaction between the grievant and the supervisor, and I found
his testimony about what he did see and hear to be equivocal and
imprecise.
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The grievant's misconduct is universally recognized as
grounds for dismissal.
Accordingly, the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The termination of Panfilo Paolilli was
for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: September 9, 1985
STATE OF New York )
.
COUNTY OF New York )
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

